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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States and elsewhere, courts are confronting questions about 
where, and to whom, domestic rights extend. The resulting jurisprudence has 
sharpened the focus on who can assert claims based on a country’s domestic 
rights provisions, and why. Despite this judicial attention, the question of 
whether a country’s domestic rights regime constrains government action 
beyond national borders has largely escaped comparative scholarly analysis.1 
 
 † Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. This 
project has benefited from discussions at the Stanford-Yale Junior Faculty Forum, the Yale-Illinois-
Princeton Comparative Law Workshop, the Georgetown International Legal Theory Colloquium, the 
Vanderbilt Foreign Relations Roundtable, the Northern California International Law Scholars 
Roundtable, meetings of the AALS Section on International Human Rights and the ASIL International 
Law in Domestic Courts Interest Group, and faculty workshops at Stanford, UCLA, and UC Hastings. I 
have been fortunate to receive comments from numerous colleagues, with particular thanks to Richard 
Albert, Diane Marie Amann, Evan Criddle, William Dodge, David Fontana, Stephen Gardbaum, Tom 
Ginsburg, Oona Hathaway, Karen Knop, Ronald Krotoczynski, Máximo Langer, Marko Milanovic, 
Gerald Neuman, Julie O’Sullivan, Kal Raustiala, Anthea Roberts, Reva Siegel, David Sloss, Tobias 
Thienel, James Whitman, and Joan Williams. Thanks also to Armond Baboomian, Josh Friedman, and 
Darya Landa for research assistance in the project’s early stages. 
 1. The leading casebooks on comparative constitutional law do not treat the question of 
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This is so even though any inquiry into extraterritorial rights is outward-facing 
by its nature, and thus invites comparative inquiry. 
Courts have been somewhat more cosmopolitan. In 1891, the U.S. 
Supreme Court invoked “the uniform practice of civilized governments for 
centuries to provide consular tribunals in other than Christian countries”2 as a 
basis for finding that the conviction of an American seaman by an American 
consular tribunal in Japan did not offend the U.S. Constitution. In 1950, the 
U.S. Supreme Court again invoked foreign practice when it found that German 
nationals taken into U.S. military custody in China, convicted of war crimes by 
a U.S. military commission there, and imprisoned in occupied Germany were 
not entitled to invoke the constitutional writ of habeas corpus to challenge the 
lawfulness of their detention.3 In considering “the extraterritorial application of 
[U.S.] organic law”4 to the German defendants, the Court found it significant 
that “[t]he practice of every modern government is opposed to it.”5 These 
cross-jurisdictional references, and the contemporary practice of domestic 
courts in citing each others’ extraterritoriality jurisprudence,6 point to a gap in 
scholarship that this Article seeks to fill. 
This Article begins by identifying three basic ways of thinking about 
rights beyond borders. It then uses this framework to analyze jurisprudence on 
the extraterritorial application of domestic rights in the United States, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom, three countries whose legal systems share a common 
historical origin. Although case law from multiple other countries was 
canvassed at the outset of this project, this Article focuses on the three 
countries whose courts have developed substantial bodies of jurisprudence in 
 
extraterritorial application of constitutional provisions. See NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS (2003); VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2006). Comparative scholarship on this question has been 
sparse, with partial exceptions, including Diane Marie Amann, Guantánamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 263 (2004) (examining U.S. case law and also considering cases from bodies including the European 
Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights); Jacco Bomhoff, The Reach of Rights: “The Foreign” and “The 
Private” in Conflict-of-Laws, State-Action, and Fundamental-Rights Cases with Foreign Elements, 71 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39 (2008) (comparing cases from different jurisdictions prior to the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s transformative decision in R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292); Sarah H. 
Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 248-67 
(2010) (discussing U.S. doctrine in light of contrasting decisions by international tribunals); Gerald L. 
Neuman, Understanding Global Due Process, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 382-91 (2009) (discussing 
foreign and international cases arising in the contexts of transnational cooperation and armed conflict). 
 2. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 462 (1891). 
 3. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 4. Id. at 784. 
 5. Id. at 785 (asserting this but not citing any specific foreign authorities). 
 6. See, e.g., Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, para. 44, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44, 
para. 44 (Can.) (citing Kaunda v. President of S. Afr., 136 I.L.R. 452 (CC 2004) (S. Afr.)); Khadr v. 
Canada (Prime Minister), 2009 FC 405, paras. 42-48, [2010] 1 F.C.R. 34, paras. 42-48 (Can.) (citing 
opinions from the United Kingdom, Australia, and South Africa); Amnesty Int’l Can. v. Canada (Chief 
of the Def. Staff), 2008 FC 336, paras. 237-66, [2008] 4 F.C.R. 546, paras. 237-66 (examining U.S., 
U.K., and European case law), aff’d 2008 FCA 401, [2009] 4 F.C.R. 149 (Can.); Kaunda, 136 I.L.R. 452 
(citing R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597 (Can.)); Smith v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2010] UKSC 29, 
[236], [2010] 3 W.L.R. 223, [236] (Lord Collins) (appeal taken from Eng.) (citing U.S. cases); R (Al-
Skeini) v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2004] EWHC (Admin) 2911, [241]-[242], [2005] 2 W.L.R. 1401, 
[241]-[242] (Eng.) (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) and R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597). 
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response to claims by individuals subjected to the extraterritorial exercise of 
government power. It therefore does not include detailed discussions of cases 
from other common law or civil law jurisdictions, leaving those to future 
scholarship. 
The conceptual framework is structured around three basic approaches to 
reasoning about rights beyond borders, which I call country, compact, and 
conscience. Country-based reasoning takes a strictly territorial approach to 
regulating the government’s actions outside the national territory, even vis-à-
vis citizens. Compact-based reasoning focuses on the entitlement of a given 
individual to assert rights against the government based on his or her status as 
one of the governed, regardless of territorial location. Conscience-based 
reasoning holds that a government should act the same way beyond its borders 
as it does within them. At the micro level, emphasizing one of these approaches 
over another can determine whether or not a given individual can successfully 
invoke domestic rights provisions as a basis for seeking relief from a domestic 
court. At the macro level, emphasizing one approach can both signal and 
reinforce a particular conception of political ordering based on territory 
(country), membership (compact), or a set of fundamental values (conscience). 
Judicial opinions merit scholarly attention both for their results and for 
their reasoning. Through the process of litigation, claimants, advocates, and 
judges develop and work through competing conceptions of the relationships 
that constitute and define the polity. Especially in common-law systems, the 
accretion of judicial opinions crystallizes sets of understandings that, in turn, 
inform individual expectations and define the range of permissible government 
action. In addition, although many of the cases discussed here involve issues 
related to national security, courts in the United States, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom have sought to articulate criteria for the extraterritorial application of 
domestic rights that transcend specific situations. 
The jurisprudence examined here demonstrates the continued relevance of 
the nation-state model, which privileges territory and membership. Domestic 
courts tend to be pulled toward the country and compact models, and have not 
embraced a conscience approach unmoored from considerations of actual 
territorial control or, particularly in the U.S. cases, membership in the political 
community. That said, they have occasionally invoked elements of a 
conscience approach when confronted with serious threats to basic separation 
of powers principles, or egregious conduct by the political branches that would 
otherwise go unaddressed. 
In reading the analysis that follows, comparative law scholars might be 
surprised at the attention given to conceptual categories, and legal theorists 
might be surprised at the detailed descriptions of case law. Each is intended to 
complement the other. The categories are designed to facilitate disentangling 
patterns of judicial reasoning, while the descriptions illustrate different 
approaches courts have taken to the geographic reach of domestic rights in 
particular circumstances. Even though common-law judges might decide 
difficult questions based on case-specific intuitions, they nonetheless have to 
articulate the basis for their decisions in terms that are more broadly applicable, 
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and that are (usually) consistent with previously stated rationales. The 
categories of country, compact, and conscience capture recurring patterns of 
judicial reasoning in the case law studied here. 
The factors affecting a national court’s willingness to find that domestic 
rights reach beyond national borders in a particular case are, indisputably, 
multiple and complex. That said, this study reveals the perhaps surprising 
tenacity of country-based reasoning that privileges the role of territory, even in 
an age of “globalization.” Scholars, advocates, and policymakers would be well 
advised to take into account the stickiness of territorially based conceptions of 
domestic rights and obligations in proposing more expansive interpretations. 
Moreover, to the extent that judgments from international bodies are 
susceptible of both narrow and broad interpretations, national courts appear 
inclined to adopt the narrowest interpretation consistent with their own sense of 
minimum fairness. This can result in a disjunction between the limited reach of 
(enforceable) domestic rights provisions and the more global reach of (less 
readily enforceable) international rights provisions. 
Despite this judicial reticence, national courts are increasingly coming 
under pressure from private litigants to apply legal constraints to extraterritorial 
government action. In practice, such pressures are most likely to be successful 
where the lack of judicial review most seriously threatens a polity’s basic 
constitutive principles, especially the domestic separation (or balance) of 
powers. I am thus less sanguine than others about the linear progression of 
national jurisprudence toward something that approximates the conscience 
model.7 Rather, although some international bodies have made statements 
tending toward a conscience approach based on universal human dignity, 
national courts are likely to continue lagging behind for reasons that include the 
entrenched political and legal significance of national boundaries, and the 
resistance and reaction of the domestic political branches to decisions that 
appear to intrude excessively into areas traditionally reserved to their 
discretion. At the end of the day, the most generative source of more expansive 
readings of domestic rights provisions might not be any comprehensive theory 
about the extraterritorial reach of rights, but rather individual judges’ own 
senses of fundamental fairness and the perceived need for a minimum set of 
judicially enforceable legal constraints on the action of the political branches. 
At this juncture, it is worth flagging several issues that this Article does 
not address. These include questions related to extraterritorial regulation, such 
as those raised in the U.S. Supreme Court case Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank Ltd., that have been ably addressed by other scholars, and which continue 
to form the subject of lively debate.8 This Article also does not address the 
 
 7. Cf. Cleveland, supra note 1, at 287 (advocating an “effective control” approach to 
extraterritorial rights and characterizing Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), as “an important 
first step” toward such an approach); Neuman, supra note 1, at 400-01 (characterizing Boumediene as 
“demonstrating majority support for the global due process/functional approach,” but acknowledging 
that its results could also be seen as consistent with a more limited “mutuality” approach). 
 8. See Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), which prompted a 
lively discussion in the blogosphere. See, for example, Gilles Cuniberti, Extraterritorial Reach of US 
Securities Laws: Online Symposium, CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (June 29, 2010), http://conflictoflaws.net/
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important questions of rights within borders,9 or rights at the border,10 which 
raise critical but distinct issues relating to the entitlements of various 
individuals present within the national territory. Finally, this Article does not 
linger on questions relating to the domestic incorporation of international 
norms, either directly or by analogy.11 To be sure, the proliferation of 
international legal instruments means that individuals often benefit, at least on 
paper, from the overlapping protection of domestic law and international law. 
Nevertheless, the case law examined here involves claims based on domestic 
rights provisions enforceable in national courts. The focus on national courts 
both delineates the scope of this analysis and distinguishes it from scholarship 
that focuses either on a single jurisdiction’s case law or on international rather 
than domestic rights. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part II explores the three approaches 
identified above: country (Section II.A), compact (Section II.B), and 
conscience (Section II.C). Part III then examines the evolving jurisprudence of 
extraterritorial rights in three jurisdictions in terms of these approaches: the 
United States under the U.S. Constitution (Section III.A), Canada under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) (Section III.B), and the 
United Kingdom under the U.K. Human Rights Act of 1998 (HRA), a statute 
that has quasi-constitutional status (Section III.C). The Conclusions indicate 
that, although claimants will continue to invite domestic courts to apply 
domestic rights provisions to extraterritorial government action, courts are 
likely to reject this invitation unless they perceive that the political branches are 
acting largely unchecked. 
In the much longer term, if national courts remain unwilling to extend 
domestic rights, claimants may increasingly seek recourse under relevant 
international instruments in both domestic and international tribunals. This shift 
could generate additional pressure on domestic courts to recognize and enforce 
certain international rights where they have a jurisdictional basis for doing so. 
It could also have an effect in the court of public opinion by reorienting the 
terms in which claims about individual rights and governmental obligations are 
articulated and advanced, whether or not they are judicially enforced. This 
reorientation could, in turn, dilute the salience of national borders as the 
primary organizing principle for legal and political relations in future 
generations, even in high-functioning democracies. 
 
2010/extraterritorial-application-of-us-securities-law-online-symposium/, and links contained therein. 
 9. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, 
THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996). 
 10. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 11. See, e.g., Fiona de Londras, What Human Rights Law Could Do: Lamenting the Absence 
of an International Human Rights Law Approach in Boumediene & Al-Odah, 41 ISR. L. REV. 562, 572-
88 (2008) (arguing that the petitioners in Boumediene should have urged the Court to follow 
international human rights jurisprudence in determining both the content and geographical scope of U.S. 
constitutional standards). 
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II. THREE APPROACHES TO DOMESTIC RIGHTS 
When government agents act beyond national borders, several distinct but 
interrelated sets of issues arise. One set of issues relates to the responsibility of 
the state, under international law, for the agent’s actions. Another set of issues 
relates to the various legal regimes that constrain the agent’s conduct, including 
the law of the agent’s home state, the domestic law of the country where the 
agent acted, applicable treaty provisions, and customary international law. A 
third and related set of issues involves institutional mechanisms for affording 
redress to those affected by the agent’s action. 
In theory, various avenues of redress might exist for an individual harmed 
by the action of a government agent outside of that agent’s “home” state, 
including seeking diplomatic protection, initiating proceedings in a court of the 
country where the harm occurred, filing an administrative claim with an 
appropriate body, or initiating proceedings before an international tribunal. In 
practice, however, such avenues can prove difficult to access or might not exist. 
When an individual invokes a country’s domestic rights regime to claim 
legal redress for harm that occurred outside of that country’s borders, the 
question of the extraterritorial application of domestic rights arises. Cases of 
this nature have proliferated in recent years in response to extraterritorial 
government action in the so-called “War on Terror,” but they also arise in the 
context of more routine extraterritorial law enforcement activities, such as 
search and seizure operations. 
In the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, jurisprudence on 
the extraterritorial application of domestic rights provisions continues to 
evolve. In part, this is due to the variety of circumstances in which, and the 
variety of individuals by whom, extraterritorial claims may be asserted. It also 
reflects the shifting interaction among at least three patterns of reasoning, 
which I call country, compact, and conscience.12 These rubrics aim to capture 
the most salient features of different approaches to extraterritorial rights. They 
also capture related differences in views about the role of domestic rights 
provisions in defining the boundaries of the polity (emphasized by a country 
approach), identifying who is “in” and who is “out” (emphasized by a compact 
approach), and constraining the action of the political branches (emphasized by 
a conscience approach). 
No taxonomy is sacrosanct, including my own. Gerald Neuman’s 
foundational work identifies four models: universalism; membership models; 
municipal law (including strict territoriality); and balancing approaches, or 
“global due process.”13 My categories have the nonsubstantive advantage of 
being alliterative, and thus easier to remember. They also seek to capture the 
 
 12. The names I have given two of these models echo the title of Louis Henkin’s 1985 lecture 
on “The Constitution as Compact and Conscience,” although Henkin did not use these terms the way I 
do. Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at 
Our Gates, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11 (1985). Henkin’s point in this article was not to examine 
extraterritorial rights per se, but rather to criticize U.S. enforcement of unfair immigration laws and the 
vulnerability of aliens to deportation. Id. at 27-28. 
 13. Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 915-19 (1991). 
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essentially different emphases of each of these approaches: territory (reflected 
in Neuman’s municipal law approach, and in my country approach), 
membership (reflected in Neuman’s membership models approach, and in my 
compact approach), or a set of fundamental values (reflected in Neuman’s 
universalism and global due process approaches, and in my conscience 
approach).14 
More recently, Judge José Cabranes has contrasted a “compact theory” of 
constitutional rights with an “organic theory,”15 essentially adopting a binary 
framework. Cabranes’s compact category is akin to my country model and to 
Neuman’s municipal law model because it focuses on the role of the 
Constitution as “a framework for establishing domestic order.”16 However, it 
does not differentiate between situations in which government action affects 
citizens and those in which it affects foreigners. Because certain cases find the 
distinction between citizens and foreigners highly significant, it seems more 
useful to reserve a separate category for strict territoriality (reflected in what I 
call the country approach) and to distinguish this from a model that emphasizes 
citizenship (which I call the compact approach). 
The tripartite framework of country, compact, and conscience captures 
important differences in emphasis among recurring patterns of argument about 
the extraterritorial application of domestic rights. Although one could choose 
different names to denominate each category, each entails a different focus. A 
country approach focuses on where the government acted, a compact approach 
focuses on who the government harmed, and a conscience approach focuses on 
what the government did. Although most judicial reasoning involves 
combinations of these approaches, assigning them labels can help to isolate and 
disentangle strands of reasoning in judicial opinions and facilitate discussion of 
contending approaches and outcomes. 
 
Approach Focus 
Country Where did the government act? 
Compact Who did the government harm? 
Conscience What did the government do? 
 
The rest of this Part sets out the underlying assumptions, and some 
limitations, of each of these approaches. 
A. Country 
Country-based reasoning emphasizes the absolute and exclusive 
 
 14. Kermit Roosevelt has suggested adopting five models: universalism, membership, 
mutuality, territoriality, and limited government. Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of 
Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2042 (2005). 
 15. See José A. Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal Procedure: Problems in the Extraterritorial 
Application of U.S. Constitutional Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1660, 1665 (2009) (identifying “two competing 
views on the extraterritorial application of constitutional requirements”). 
 16. Id. 
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sovereignty of each country over its own territory.17 Rather than recognizing, as 
international law does, that a country can legitimately exercise prescriptive 
jurisdiction over the extraterritorial actions of its own nationals,18 a country-
based approach treats domestic rights as ending at the water’s edge. Country-
based reasoning thus begins—and ends—by asking: where did the government 
act? If government agents act beyond their own national borders, then domestic 
rights provisions do not constrain their actions under a country approach, 
although their actions would be constrained (at least in theory) by applicable 
international law and the local law of the place where they acted. 
The country approach is encapsulated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
statement in In re Ross that “[t]he Constitution can have no operation in 
another country,”19 and by the Canadian Supreme Court’s much more recent 
decision in R. v. Hape.20 In that case, the Canadian Supreme Court held that a 
Canadian citizen could not invoke the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms to object to the introduction of evidence gathered by Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) officers in the Turks and Caicos Islands for use in a 
Canadian prosecution. The majority in Hape applied a country approach to the 
operation of law and legal authority to reach this result. 
A country approach avoids three related problems. First, it avoids the 
problem of “legal limbo.”21 It does this by conceptualizing activities on a given 
segment of territory as governed exclusively by one sovereign’s law (and 
possibly by international law, formed by the consent of all sovereigns), thereby 
avoiding many possible ambiguities about applicable legal regimes. Second, 
from an institutional perspective, it provides a way for courts to limit their 
intrusion into certain cases involving foreign relations and national security by 
radically circumscribing the role of judicial review when the government acts 
beyond national borders. Third, it prevents accusations that the extraterritorial 
application of domestic legal standards, which might conflict with local norms, 
amounts to legal imperialism. 
Despite these possible advantages, a strict country approach remains 
unsatisfying for several reasons. First, it ignores the reality that countries 
routinely regulate extraterritorial and transnational activity, even if they require 
a domestic nexus to legitimate such regulation. Second, a country approach 
seems unduly susceptible to manipulation since, particularly in the context of 
claims related to detention and interrogation, it predicates entitlement to 
constitutional protection on presence within the national territory—something 
that the detaining or interrogating authority can control by transporting an 
individual from one location to another. Third, contrary to allegations of 
 
 17. This reasoning falls within what Neuman refers to as “municipal law approaches” to 
extraterritoriality. Neuman, supra note 13, at 918. Roosevelt separates out this line of reasoning under 
the rubric of “territoriality.” Roosevelt, supra note 14, at 2044. 
 18. International law accepts the nationality of the actor as a valid basis for the exercise of 
prescriptive jurisdiction, subject to a reasonableness standard. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 402(2) (1987). 
 19. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891). 
 20. R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, para. 69, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, para. 69. 
 21. My thanks to Máximo Langer for pointing out this perceived advantage. 
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imperialism, when a state’s own agents operate extraterritorially, it is neither 
unreasonable nor imperialistic for their own actions to be constrained by 
standards prescribed by their domestic political processes, in addition to 
standards prescribed by the local jurisdiction and applicable international 
standards. 
A country approach privileges territorial sovereignty as the primary 
organizing principle of legal and political relations.22 Elements of a country 
approach remain remarkably tenacious in contemporary jurisprudence, as 
illustrated in Part III. That said, particularly where a government’s 
extraterritorial action affects its own citizens, individuals may seek protection 
under that country’s domestic rights regime. In so doing, they claim entitlement 
to protection based not on territory but rather on membership—the focus of a 
compact approach. 
B. Compact 
When extraterritorial government action affects citizens, claimants often 
invoke a compact-based approach to domestic rights. A compact approach 
identifies “the people” as rights holders and, thus, potential claimants against 
the government.23 Whereas a country approach focuses on where the 
government acted, a compact approach focuses on who the government 
harmed. Compact-based reasoning has a long pedigree in Western political 
theory and represents a familiar trope for judges and policymakers.24 As 
historian Gordon Wood has noted, the American colonists were imbued with 
contractual images, most prominently “that of a mutual bargain between two 
parties drawn from the legal and mercantile world, more specifically, the 
political agreement between ruler and people in which protection and 
allegiance became the considerations.”25 A compact approach highlights the 
role of a constitution as a mutual agreement enforceable by parties to that 
agreement. 
In the context of extraterritorial rights, a compact approach is more 
expansive than a country approach, because it extends constitutional 
protections to citizens overseas. (This is true even though within a particular 
country a compact approach could be more restrictive than a country approach 
by according greater rights to citizens than to others who are present on the 
 
 22. I agree with Paul Schiff Berman that “the reality of human interaction is chafing against 
the strictures our current conception of legal jurisdiction imposes,” but, like Berman, I recognize the 
continued reassertion of those strictures by national legal and political actors. See Paul Schiff Berman, 
The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 543 (2002). 
 23. Neuman categorizes contractual approaches as “membership models,” and notes the 
existence of various approaches to defining members and nonmembers. See Neuman, supra note 13, at 
917-18. 
 24. See CHIMÈNE I. KEITNER, THE PARADOXES OF NATIONALISM: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 
AND ITS MEANING FOR CONTEMPORARY NATION BUILDING 35-42 (2007) (discussing Hobbesian, 
Lockean, and Rousseauean models). 
 25. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 268-69 (2d 
ed. 1998). Philip Hamburger’s recent work on the principle of protection could be viewed as one 
example of a compact-based model. See Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
1823 (2009). 
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territory, but who are not considered part of “the people.”)26 A compact 
approach differentiates among individuals based on their membership in a 
given political community, rather than their physical location. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 
encapsulates a compact approach to extraterritorial rights.27 The Chief Justice 
reasoned that a nonresident alien whose foreign property was searched by U.S. 
agents could not invoke Fourth Amendment protections because the Fourth 
Amendment was only designed to protect “a class of persons who are part of a 
national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection 
with this country to be considered part of that community.”28 Because compact-
based reasoning focuses on the status of an individual as part of a particular 
community, it denies domestic rights to nonmembers when a government acts 
outside its national territory. Compact-based reasoning would, however, extend 
domestic rights to members regardless of their physical location. A compact 
approach thus would have compelled a different result in the case of Mr. Hape, 
the Canadian citizen who was unable to invoke the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms to object to the introduction of evidence gathered by Canadian 
RCMP officers abroad.29 This approach would also encompass U.S. citizens 
affected by other forms of extraterritorial government action, such as the son of 
the plaintiff in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, who has allegedly been singled out for 
targeted killing in Yemen, and who claims that this violates his Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment rights.30 
The most obvious normative difficulty with a compact approach based on 
citizenship is the arbitrariness of differentiating among individuals based solely 
on their citizenship (which is often determined by their place of birth or the 
place of their parents’ birth). This is, of course, an endemic feature of 
citizenship-based models of political entitlements, and it is not specific to the 
context of extraterritorial rights. Even if one defines the compact more broadly 
to include noncitizens with significant ties to an existing political and territorial 
community, the compact approach excludes individuals who are involuntarily 
affected by government action on a basis unrelated to any choice they have 
made (except perhaps in the rare case of an individual who has voluntarily 
declined an opportunity for naturalization). In part for this reason, Justice 
Stevens in Verdugo resisted the Chief Justice’s definition of the compact, 
 
 26. My thanks to Vicki Jackson for raising this point. 
 27. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 28. Id. at 265; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2301 (2008) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (stating that “merely because citizenship is not a sufficient factor to extend constitutional 
rights abroad does not mean that it is not a necessary one”). 
 29. R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, para. 69, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, para. 69; see also supra text 
accompanying note 20. 
 30. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 1:10-cv-
01469 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2010). Notably, the government’s motion to dismiss the complaint did not 
claim that Al-Aulaqi does not benefit from constitutional rights (although it did emphasize that Al-
Aulaqi is a dual U.S.-Yemeni citizen). Instead, it argued that his father lacks standing to bring claims on 
his behalf; that the case involves nonjusticiable political questions; and that litigation is barred by the 
states secrets privilege. See Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 1:10-cv-01469-
JDB (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2010). 
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which would have extended certain extraterritorial rights only to individuals 
with “voluntary attachment” to the United States.31 Instead, Justice Stevens 
would have included Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez in “the people” because he was 
lawfully present in the United States, even though he was brought there 
involuntarily.32 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting in Verdugo, would have 
included Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez in “the people” on the basis of his obligation 
to comply with U.S. criminal laws. In their view, this obligation made him one 
of “the governed” and entitled him to domestic rights under the principle of 
mutuality.33 This approach attempts to avoid the problem of arbitrariness, 
because it provides that citizens and foreigners who are held “to the same 
standards of conduct” benefit from the same protections.34 However, although 
moving away from a citizenship model of the compact makes the membership 
criteria less arbitrary, it also makes these criteria less determinate, as the 
question arises of what combination of attachment, territorial presence, and 
legal obligation is sufficient to make an individual one of the governed. 
A compact model that is not based purely on citizenship is an 
improvement over a strict citizenship model because it more accurately reflects 
the reality that governmental power affects individuals of many nationalities, 
who are all worthy of protection by virtue of their humanity. A similar 
observation stands at the core of the international human rights system that, as 
Stephen Gardbaum has recognized, “enshrines—and clarifies—the distinct 
normative basis for the protection of fundamental rights as rights of human 
beings rather than as rights of citizens.”35 That said, precisely because 
constitutional law is often understood as protecting the rights of citizens, an 
infinitely elastic compact model has not found favor with courts, and it is 
unlikely to do so. 
If one focuses on connections rather than merely citizenship, a court 
following Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning in Verdugo would presumably 
recognize only those connections voluntarily entered into by the individual as a 
potential basis for extending domestic rights. By contrast, a court following 
Justice Stevens’s reasoning might be more sympathetic to the notion that 
unilateral government action could bring an individual within the ambit of 
certain domestic rights provisions. As the focus shifts away from the 
relationship between the government and the individual to the action of the 
government regardless of the individual’s territorial location or personal status, 
a compact model blends into what I call a conscience approach.36 
 
 31. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 283-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 34. Id. at 285. 
 35. Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights and International Constitutionalism, in RULING THE 
WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 233 (Jeffrey L. 
Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009). 
 36. Roosevelt points out that Neuman’s “mutuality of obligation” model, under which the U.S. 
government’s requirement that an alien comply with U.S. law triggers constitutional protections, 
approaches the universalism model. See Roosevelt, supra note 14, at 2057-58. Because of their different 
rationales, I would categorize mutuality as a compact-based approach and universalism as a conscience-
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C. Conscience 
At the most basic level, a conscience model holds that a government 
should act the same way beyond its borders as it does within them. Justice 
Brennan appealed to a conscience model in his Verdugo dissent when he 
emphasized that “when United States agents conduct unreasonable searches, 
whether at home or abroad, they disregard our Nation’s values.”37 Despite the 
risk of anthropomorphism, I use the term “conscience” for this model because 
(in addition to the fact that it starts with the letter “c”) it captures the idea that 
constitutional limits, like a person’s conscience, follow the government 
everywhere. Although the term “conscience” is potentially problematic because 
it may appear to entail a particular set of value judgments, I use it only to signal 
that this approach, unlike a country or compact approach, does not preclude the 
application of domestic constraints to government action on the basis of 
territory or membership. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit in Eisentrager v. 
Forrestal held that “a distinction between citizens and aliens cannot be made in 
respect to the applicability of constitutional restrictions upon the power of 
government,”38 even overseas. (The U.S. Supreme Court overruled that 
decision.)39 More recently, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
articulated a conscience approach in Issa v. Turkey, a case brought by family 
members of Iraqi nationals allegedly harmed by Turkish forces operating in 
Northern Iraq. The Court opined that the European Convention on Human 
Rights “cannot be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate 
violations of the Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not 
perpetrate on its own territory.”40 
In terms of U.S. constitutional history, it is interesting to note that the 
contractual analogy at the root of the compact model appears to have been 
largely displaced by the conscience-based idea of a constitution as “a 
fundamental law designed by the people to be separate from and controlling of 
all the institutions of government.”41 Seen from this perspective, a bill of rights 
or other written formulation of fundamental law defines the parameters of 
permissible government action wherever, and toward whomever, the 
 
based approach. 
 37. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 285 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 38. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
 39. See discussion of Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), infra notes 72-73 and 
accompanying text. 
 40. Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 567, ¶ 71 (2004). This language did 
not originate with the ECHR. As recognized by the U.K. divisional court in Al-Skeini, it had previously 
appeared in a report by the U.N. Human Rights Committee on alleged violations of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by Uruguay in detaining a Uruguayan trade unionist on 
Argentine territory. R (Al-Skeini) v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2004] EWHC (Admin) 2911, [213], [2005] 
2 W.L.R. 1401, [213] (Eng.) (citing U.N. Human Rights Comm’n, Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Comm. 
No. 52/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979 (July 29, 1981)). The extraterritorial application of 
human rights treaties generally, and the interaction between human rights and humanitarian law 
obligations in situations of occupation or armed conflict in particular, are beyond the scope of this 
Article. See generally Marko Milanović, From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of 
State Jurisdiction in Human Rights Treaties, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 411 (2008). 
 41. See WOOD, supra note 25, at 283. 
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government acts.42 Rather than focusing on where the government acted or who 
the government harmed, the conscience approach asks: what did the 
government do? 
Rhetorical appeals to a conscience model generally invoke a country’s 
basic values. Those values might entail substantive prescriptions, such as not 
inflicting torture. They might also involve structural principles such as the 
value of living in a government characterized by checks and balances, or in 
which the government cannot act beyond the scope of its enumerated powers. 
In practice, courts appear to resort to conscience-based arguments when they 
feel that the political branches have seriously violated either a substantive or 
structural value, but not otherwise. 
Given the practical limits to the extraterritorial application of 
constitutional guarantees, a conscience approach does not necessarily require 
universal entitlement to the full panoply of domestic rights.43 Even within the 
territorial limits of a particular country, rights may be subject to balancing, as 
indicated for example by section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, which guarantees enumerated rights subject to “such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.”44 However, at a minimum, the conscience model 
guarantees certain core domestic rights to individuals affected by 
extraterritorial government action, regardless of their citizenship. Conscience-
based reasoning is, broadly speaking, the most expansive of the three 
approaches. It is also potentially the least deferential to the territorial 
sovereignty of other countries and to the domestic political branches. 
The main drawback of the conscience approach, particularly from the 
perspective of the political branches, is its potentially robust curtailment of 
government action (leading to accusations of “lawfare” against those who file 
suit in domestic court to challenge extraterritorial government action).45 In 
addition, if one posits that “what a state owes should depend on what it can 
deliver,”46 then the inevitable question arises of who will determine what the 
state can, in fact, deliver, and how a state will know ex ante what obligations it 
owes in particular circumstances. Gerald Neuman argues compellingly in 
support of his “global due process” approach (which I would characterize as a 
form of conscience-based reasoning) that this “uncertainty is preferable to the 
 
 42. Neuman has described this as a “universalist” approach to the extraterritorial constitution. 
See Neuman, supra note 13, at 916. Roosevelt proposes slightly different terminology, using the term 
“textualism” synonymously with Neuman’s universalism model and identifying “limited government” 
as a separate model. See Roosevelt, supra note 14, at 2049-50. 
 43. Neuman uses the term “global due process” to denote an approach that “recognize[s] 
constitutional rights as potentially applicable worldwide, and then balance[s] them away.” Neuman, 
supra note 13, at 920. 
 44. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 1 (U.K.). 
 45. See, e.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 89-90. (D.C. Cir. 2010) (emphasizing 
concerns about lawfare expressed in the Eisentrager opinion); U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, THE NATIONAL 
DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 (2005), available at http://www.defense
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 46. Neuman, supra note 1, at 391. 
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brutal clarity of denying any rights to foreign nationals abroad.”47 However, 
while this is no doubt true as a general proposition, it has not deterred 
governments and some courts from adopting a country- or a narrow compact-
based approach that has the benefit of “brutal clarity,” as explored in more 
detail below. 
Despite the lack of predictability, the conscience model remains 
normatively attractive for several reasons. First, it recognizes that both 
territorial location and personal status are largely accidental, and that no set of 
individuals intrinsically “deserves” protection more than another. Second, it 
reflects the idea of a constitution or fundamental law as defining the outer 
limits of permissible government action wherever the government acts. Third, it 
prevents the categorical insulation of certain types of government action from 
judicial review. However, despite these potential benefits, courts have almost 
uniformly rejected the argument that an individual who is affected by a 
government’s extraterritorial action can automatically invoke that 
government’s domestic rights regime. The normative appeal of a conscience 
model has not outweighed its perceived practical and institutional costs. 
The analysis in Part III suggests that domestic courts are unlikely to 
invoke conscience-based reasoning unless they are faced with a flagrant 
violation of separation of powers principles (for example, the deliberate 
relocation of individuals in custody in order to avoid judicial review) or with 
what they perceive to be particularly egregious conduct by the political 
branches that is not justified by extenuating circumstances. Consequently, not 
all individuals who are injured by government agents can assert rights-based 
claims in that government’s domestic courts, particularly if those courts do not 
provide remedies for violations of foreign or international law. In the 
Conclusions, I offer some thoughts about the long-term effect that this judicial 
reticence to extend domestic rights might have in creating pressure for more 
robust enforcement of international rights. To date, however, the disjunction 
between international rights and domestic remedies has failed to persuade 
judges to extend domestic rights extraterritorially in all but exceptional 
circumstances, as illustrated in Part III. 
III. THREE DOMESTIC RIGHTS REGIMES 
Recent cases from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom 
illustrate the range of rationales that animate judicial decisions about the 
extraterritorial reach of domestic rights. This Part examines some of these cases 
in light of the framework set out above. At least two caveats apply. First, 
judicial opinions are certainly not the only vehicle for the interpretation of 
domestic rights guarantees. All branches of government in a constitutional 
democracy are bound to act in accordance with that country’s fundamental law 
and, thus, to determine when actions might run afoul of applicable restrictions. 
Judicial opinions nonetheless merit close attention because of their public and 
authoritative role in interpreting the reach of rights, and because individuals 
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seeking redress for alleged violations often do so through domestic courts. 
Second, my goal in the pages that follow is not to offer a comprehensive 
historical account of any country’s jurisprudence, nor to suggest that any 
country has adopted a particular mode of reasoning wholesale. Rather, I aim to 
illuminate patterns of reasoning in recent cases to show how different courts 
have grappled with similar questions. In all three jurisdictions, cases continue 
to be brought by individuals seeking domestic rights protections in a variety of 
extraterritorial settings. The outcomes of novel cases may appear largely 
unpredictable, precisely because the relevant jurisprudence continues to evolve. 
Identifying patterns of reasoning, and exploring their implications, can help 
explain this evolution and make it more transparent. 
Of the three domestic rights regimes whose application is examined here, 
the U.S. model of judicial review will likely be the most familiar to readers. 
According to this model, in the words of U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice 
John Marshall, “an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is 
void.”48 Marshall himself looked beyond U.S. borders in establishing the role 
of judicial review as a cornerstone of U.S. constitutionalism, observing in 
Marbury v. Madison that “all those who have framed written constitutions 
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the 
nation.”49 Conversely, following World War II and again following the collapse 
of many communist regimes, it was not a great exaggeration to say that the 
“growth of world constitutionalism [was] the growth of the model of 
constitutionalism invented in the United States.”50 
There is more to the global constitutional landscape, however, than U.S.-
style constitutional regimes. As Stephen Gardbaum has emphasized, some 
countries have sought a middle ground between constitutional and legislative 
supremacy by institutionalizing judicial review while still enabling the 
legislature to “have the final word,” albeit at a potential political cost.51 These 
countries’ charters of rights, which include the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act (HRA), “attempt . . . 
to create institutional balance, joint responsibility, and deliberative dialogue 
between courts and legislatures in the protection and enforcement of 
fundamental rights.”52 Even though judicial opinions in these countries are 
more explicitly envisioned as part of a dialogue with the legislature, they 
remain important expressions of constitutional commitments that cannot easily 
be set aside. 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to both the federal 
 
 48. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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and provincial governments.53 Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Charter 
contains a “notwithstanding” clause, which authorizes the Canadian Parliament 
or a provincial legislature to enact legislation that would otherwise violate a 
specified Charter right for a renewable five-year period, if it attaches an explicit 
declaration to this effect to the legislation.54 In practice, the Notwithstanding 
Clause has been used sparingly.55 Some observers in the United Kingdom, 
seeking lessons for their own system, have maintained that “political reluctance 
to use the Notwithstanding Clause means that the Charter has evolved in a 
manner indistinguishable from American-style judicial review.”56 
Under the HRA, Chapter 42, the House of Lords (now the U.K. Supreme 
Court) and other specified courts cannot invalidate legislation, but they can 
issue a “declaration of incompatibility” under section 4 where a legislative 
provision is found to be incompatible with a right guaranteed by the European 
Convention on Human Rights.57 The Lord Chancellor at the time the HRA was 
enacted opined that “‘[i]f a Minister’s prior assessment of compatibility (under 
[section] 19) is subsequently found by declaration of incompatibility by the 
courts to have been mistaken, it is hard to see how a Minister could withhold 
remedial action.”58 Also, importantly, under section 3 of the HRA, courts can 
read down legislation incompatible with the Act to make it compatible.59 Thus, 
although the effect of judicial review might be somewhat attenuated in the 
Canadian and U.K. contexts, it is by no means insubstantial. Observers have 
indicated that, since the enactment of the HRA, a rights-based approach has 
become entrenched, perhaps irreversibly, in U.K. common law.60 
The judicial decisions examined below all endeavor to interpret and apply 
core codifications of domestic rights guarantees, even though the U.K. cases do 
so with explicit reference to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR). I therefore treat these decisions as relevantly similar for the 
purpose of comparing their approaches to the extraterritorial reach of domestic 
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rights, even though each is indisputably embedded in a particular political and 
institutional context.61 By expanding the analysis beyond a single jurisdiction, 
this Article can more confidently claim that the patterns of argument it 
identifies are not merely a product of national idiosyncrasies, but have broader 
significance as modes of reasoning about a common set of problems that arise 
in different legal systems, albeit ones with a common historical origin. 
A. The United States 
U.S. jurisprudence on extraterritorial rights has received recent scholarly 
and public attention because of its central role in defining the ability of 
noncitizen detainees held by the U.S. government outside the territorial United 
States to challenge the lawfulness of their detention and treatment. As scholars 
have recognized, the detainee cases raise issues that go beyond the terrorism 
context, including core questions relating to the normative and doctrinal basis 
for extending—or declining to extend—constitutional protections overseas.62 
In its most recent statements regarding extraterritorial rights, the Supreme 
Court has continued to reject the D.C. Circuit’s conscience-based conclusion in 
Eisentrager v. Forrestal, which the Supreme Court promptly overturned, that 
“[i]f the action of Government officials be beyond their constitutional power, it 
is for that reason a nullity.”63 The Supreme Court also rejected the D.C. 
Circuit’s country-based conclusion almost sixty years later in Boumediene v. 
Bush that “the Constitution does not confer rights on aliens without property or 
presence within the United States.”64 Instead, the Supreme Court’s Boumediene 
decision enumerates three factors relevant to whether or not a given individual 
detained outside the territorial United States has a constitutional right to seek 
habeas review, which correspond to the three categories enumerated above: the 
nature of the site of apprehension and detention (country); the citizenship and 
status of the detainee (compact); and practical obstacles to extending the writ of 
habeas corpus (conscience).65 Tracing the path to Boumediene can help 
illuminate the significance of each of these factors, which lower courts are now 
attempting faithfully to apply.66 
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1. A “Functional Approach” to Domestic Rights 
Detainees have attempted to invoke the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in two 
principal ways: first, by challenging the lawfulness of their continued detention, 
and second, by seeking civil damages for allegedly unlawful treatment. The 
posture of these cases reflects peculiarities of the U.S. legal system, which 
predicates federal jurisdiction on the existence of a case or controversy, and 
which institutionalizes tort damages as a central vehicle for deterring and 
remedying rights violations. This Subsection describes the tensions among 
various strands of reasoning in U.S. jurisprudence on extraterritorial rights, 
which are currently being mediated through what the Supreme Court calls “a 
functional approach to questions of extraterritoriality.”67 
The Court’s 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush must be read against 
prior cases, none of which it explicitly overrules. The first case is In re Ross, in 
which the Court found that the constitutional right to a jury trial did not apply 
to individuals subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. consular courts in “non-
Christian” countries.68 The Court deemed Ross, a British subject from Prince 
Edward Island, a de facto U.S. citizen during his period of enlistment as a 
crewmember on a U.S. ship. Ross was accused of murdering the ship’s second 
mate while the ship was in Japanese territorial waters, and he was convicted in 
a proceeding conducted in Japan under the authority of the U.S. consul. Having 
found that Ross was an American for jurisdictional purposes,69 the Court 
nevertheless rejected Ross’s argument that he was entitled to a jury trial: 
The deck of a private American vessel, it is true, is considered for many 
purposes constructively as territory of the United States, yet persons on board 
of such vessels, whether officers, sailors, or passengers, cannot invoke the 
protection of the provisions referred to until brought within the actual 
territorial boundaries of the United States. And, besides, their enforcement 
abroad in numerous places, where it would be highly important to have consuls 
invested with judicial authority, would be impracticable from the impossibility 
of obtaining a competent grand or petit jury. The requirement of such a body to 
accuse and to try an offender would, in a majority of cases, cause an 
abandonment of all prosecution.70 
The Ross Court adopted a country-based approach, emphasizing that Ross had 
not been “brought within the actual territorial boundaries of the United 
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States.”71 Had it instead adopted a compact approach based on citizenship, it 
would likely have found that Ross was entitled to a jury trial, because he was 
enlisted as a crewmember on a U.S. ship. 
The second significant case is Johnson v. Eisentrager, which involved the 
habeas petitions of twenty-one German nationals who were apprehended in 
China, convicted of war crimes by a U.S. military commission in Nanking, and 
repatriated to Germany to serve their sentences.72 The Supreme Court found 
that the petitioners were not entitled to habeas review by U.S. courts because 
they were enemy aliens captured, tried, and detained outside of U.S. territory. 
The Court explicitly rejected the broad conscience approach that had been 
taken by the D.C. Circuit in reaching the opposite conclusion.73 The result in 
Eisentrager could be viewed as consistent with a country approach (because 
the petitioners were not physically present on U.S. territory) or a compact 
approach (because they were German nationals). 
The third case is Reid v. Covert, which determined that the wives of U.S. 
servicemen stationed at U.S. military bases in England and Japan and accused 
of murdering their husbands there were constitutionally entitled to trial by a 
civilian jury instead of a military court-martial.74 Justice Black’s plurality 
opinion on rehearing in Reid found that “the Constitution in its entirety applied 
to the trials” of the wives,75 because “[t]he term ‘land and naval Forces’ [in 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, under which Congress authorizes military rather 
than civilian trials] refers to persons who are members of the armed services 
and not to their civilian wives, children and other dependents.”76 The second 
Justice Harlan wrote a concurring opinion advocating a less textualist approach. 
In Justice Harlan’s view, the wives were entitled to a civilian jury trial in these 
particular circumstances (capital cases involving civilian dependants of the 
armed forces stationed overseas in times of peace), because applying the jury 
trial provisions of the Constitution would not be “impracticable and 
anomalous.”77 In contrast to Justice Black’s more formalist plurality opinion, 
Justice Harlan asked “which guarantees of the Constitution should apply in 
view of the particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible 
alternatives which Congress had before it.”78 He deemed this question “one of 
judgment, not of compulsion,”79 which required “weighing the competing 
considerations”80 rather than trading in doctrinal absolutes. Justice Harlan 
resisted a bright-line rule and emphasized the importance of context, rather than 
finding as an absolute matter that U.S. citizens who are not members of the 
 
 71. Id. at 464. 
 72. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 73. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
 74. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 75. Id. at 18 (plurality opinion) (Black, J.). According to Kal Raustiala, “What motivated the 
rehearing is unclear.” RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG, supra note 62, at 280 
n.70. 
 76. Reid, 354 U.S. at 19-20. 
 77. Id. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 78. Id. at 75 (emphasis in original). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 77. 
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armed services are entitled to trial by a civilian jury. 
Justice Black criticized Justice Harlan’s approach, insisting that 
[t]he concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against 
arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when 
expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to 
flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the 
basis of our Government.81 
This critique resists the Harlan approach because it is potentially too narrow, 
not too broad. Perhaps Justice Harlan had greater confidence than Justice Black 
in his approach because he trusted courts, rather than the political branches, to 
determine whether or not extending domestic rights in a particular situation 
would be “impracticable.” 
Justice Harlan’s approach has long appealed to Justice Kennedy, who first 
demonstrated his affinity for it in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.82 In that 
case, a Mexican citizen and resident claimed that the warrantless search and 
seizure of his residence and property in Mexico by U.S. agents violated the 
Fourth Amendment.83 The majority opinion in Verdugo, authored by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, adopted a compact approach to limit the extraterritorial 
reach of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement to U.S. citizens and 
those with substantial voluntary ties to the United States.84 While Justice 
Kennedy agreed with the majority that the extraterritorial search at issue did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment, he distanced himself from the majority’s heavy 
reliance on the Fourth Amendment’s use of the term “the people” to 
circumscribe its application. Instead, Justice Kennedy opined that 
[t]he restrictions that the United States must observe with reference to aliens 
beyond its territory or jurisdiction depend . . . on general principles of 
interpretation, not on an inquiry as to who formed the Constitution or a 
construction that some rights are mentioned as being those of “the people.”85 
Justice Kennedy thus rejected a definition of constitutional guarantees based 
purely on personal status and/or sustained voluntary presence within U.S. 
territory—in other words, he rejected a compact approach. 
Justice Kennedy did not embrace a country approach, however, because 
he acknowledged that the Constitution could, in appropriate circumstances, 
constrain extraterritorial government action. He also rejected an absolutist 
version of the conscience-based approach. He quoted Justice Harlan’s Reid 
 
 81. Id. at 14 (plurality opinion) (Black, J.). 
 82. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 83. The foreign location of the alleged violation of the warrant requirement distinguishes 
Verdugo from cases suppressing evidence obtained abroad and used in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination. The majority reasoned in Verdugo that “[a]lthough 
[extraterritorial] conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair th[e] right 
[against self-incrimination], a constitutional violation occurs only at trial” in the United States. Id. at 
264; see also United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 181 (2d Cir. 2001) (indicating that “any 
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination occurs, not at the moment law enforcement officials 
coerce statements through custodial interrogation, but when a defendant’s involuntary statements are 
actually used against him at an American criminal proceeding”). 
 84. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28, 31-34. 
 85. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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concurrence at length for the proposition that “‘there is no rigid and abstract 
rule that Congress . . . must exercise [its power overseas] subject to all the 
guarantees of the Constitution, no matter what the conditions and 
considerations are that would make adherence to a specific guarantee altogether 
impracticable and anomalous.’”86 Justice Kennedy thus drew a line of 
continuity from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Reid to his own concurrence in 
Verdugo, foreshadowing his approach to the petitions filed on behalf of 
Guantanamo detainees in Boumediene. 
As indicated above in Section II.B, Justice Stevens, who concurred 
separately in Verdugo, took a somewhat different approach from Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and from Justice Kennedy. Like the Chief Justice, he employed 
compact-based reasoning, but he defined the compact more expansively. In his 
view, Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez was one of “the people” by virtue of having been 
brought into the United States for the purpose of prosecution.87 Even so, Justice 
Stevens found that the search and seizure of Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez’s property 
in Mexico with the “approval and cooperation of the Mexican authorities” was 
not “unreasonable” under the first clause of the Fourth Amendment.88 He 
further reasoned that the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment did not 
apply to searches of noncitizens’ property in foreign jurisdictions, where U.S. 
magistrates have no power to authorize such searches—a reflection consistent 
with a country approach, which emphasizes territorial limits on the exercise of 
a particular country’s prescriptive jurisdiction.89 
This is where U.S. jurisprudence stood on the eve of Rasul v. Bush, a case 
that involved the statutory (rather than the constitutional) right to seek habeas 
review. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Rasul, which affirmed the 
ability of Guantanamo detainees to invoke the statutory habeas jurisdiction of 
U.S. federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2241—the provision whose subsequent 
modification by Congress prompted the constitutional challenge in 
Boumediene. Although statutory cases are outside the scope of this analysis, it 
is worth noting that Justice Stevens gave an oblique nod to the functional 
approach to extraterritorial rights previously endorsed by Justice Harlan in Reid 
and Justice Kennedy in Verdugo.90 It is also worth noting elements of Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rasul that foreshadowed his approach in 
Boumediene. First, Justice Kennedy expressed the view that “Guantanamo Bay 
is in every practical respect a United States territory.”91 Second, he 
distinguished the facts of Rasul from those in Eisentrager by emphasizing that 
“the detainees at Guantanamo Bay are being held indefinitely, and without 
benefit of any legal proceeding to determine their status.”92 He reasoned: 
Because the prisoners in Eisentrager were proven enemy aliens found and 
 
 86. Id. at 277-78 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 87. Id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 n.15 (2004) (referring to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
in Verdugo with a “cf.” citation). 
 91. Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 92. Id. at 487-88. 
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detained outside the United States, and because the existence of jurisdiction 
would have had a clear harmful effect on the Nation’s military affairs, the 
matter was appropriately left to the Executive Branch and there was no 
jurisdiction for the courts to hear the prisoner’s claims.93 
Justice Kennedy found that this separation of powers rationale for judicial 
restraint was much weaker in Rasul than it was in Eisentrager and therefore did 
not preclude extending habeas jurisdiction to the claims of Guantanamo 
detainees.94 
In October 2006, in response to Rasul, the 109th U.S. Congress purported 
to strip federal courts of their jurisdiction to hear any application for a writ of 
habeas corpus “filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States 
who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained 
as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.”95 The petitioners in 
Boumediene challenged this legislation by invoking the Suspension Clause, 
which provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety 
may require it.”96 The writ of habeas corpus has achieved iconic status in 
common law systems that have institutionalized judicial review of detentions as 
a check on the arbitrary exercise of executive power. The Suspension Clause 
literally confers constitutive status on this protection as a defining feature of 
government based on the separation of powers. While separation-of-powers 
concerns animate any consideration of the scope of judicial review, they are 
especially salient where the right to petition for habeas relief is involved. 
Justice Kennedy begins his opinion for the majority in Boumediene by 
affirming that “foreign nationals who have the privilege of litigating in our 
courts can seek to enforce separation-of-powers principles.”97 The detainees’ 
lack of U.S. citizenship does not, by itself, bar their claims. The majority turns 
first to history to discern whether or not the constitutional writ of habeas corpus 
(as opposed to its statutory counterpart) extends to Guantanamo detainees, 
while emphasizing that the Court “has been careful not to foreclose the 
possibility that the protections of the Suspension Clause have expanded along 
with post-1789 developments that define the present scope of the writ [of 
habeas corpus].”98 The majority finds a founding-era resolution of the 
Guantanamo dilemma elusive: 
In none of the cases cited do we find that a common-law court would or would 
not have granted, or refused to hear for lack of jurisdiction, a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus brought by a prisoner deemed an enemy combatant, under a 
 
 93. Id. at 486. 
 94. Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Rasul majority instead distinguished Eisentrager on the 
basis that Eisentrager did not involve the statutory habeas jurisdiction of U.S. courts, and was therefore 
not controlling in Rasul. Id. at 476 (majority opinion); see also id. at 479 (finding that “Eisentrager 
plainly does not preclude the exercise of § 2441 jurisdiction over petitioners’ claims”). But see id. at 491 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (disputing this interpretation of Eisentrager). 
 95. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2006). 
 96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 97. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246 (2008) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
958-59 (1983)). 
 98. Id. at 2248 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300-01 (2001)). 
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standard like the one the Department of Defense has used in these cases, and 
when held in a territory, like Guantanamo, over which the Government has total 
military and civil control.99 
The majority recognizes that both territory (country) and citizenship (compact) 
have played a role in historical definitions of the scope of habeas protection, 
but it does not find historical analogies close enough to the Guantanamo 
situation to compel a particular result. Instead, the majority draws a negative 
lesson from these historical cases, highlighting the “prudential” concerns that 
arguably animated their results,100 and rejecting “a categorical or formal 
conception of sovereignty”101 that defined or defines the geographical scope of 
habeas protection. The majority appears to accept as a starting premise that 
constitutional protections may apply extraterritorially in certain circumstances, 
but that such protections do not automatically apply extraterritorially simply 
because the U.S. government has acted. The question is how to define the 
parameters of constitutional constraints, if not through bright-line rules 
associated with formal territorial boundaries or citizenship. 
The majority’s rejection of “formal” conceptions of sovereignty in 
defining the geographic boundaries of habeas protection proves pivotal because 
Cuba indisputably maintains de jure sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay.102 The 
majority “take[s] notice of the obvious and uncontested fact that the United 
States, by virtue of its complete jurisdiction and control over the base, 
maintains de facto sovereignty over this territory.”103 As a doctrinal matter, the 
majority rejects the government’s position that “at least as applied to 
noncitizens, the Constitution necessarily stops where de jure sovereignty 
ends.”104 On its face, it is not clear whether the majority is simply adopting a 
different definition of what counts as U.S. territory for habeas purposes (thus 
essentially adopting a country approach), or whether its reasoning is more 
expansive. One clue that the holding can properly be construed as more than 
just a redefined country approach is the majority’s emphasis on the “[p]ractical 
considerations”105 that informed the Court’s decision in Eisentrager, whereas a 
country approach would instead adopt a bright-line rule. 
The majority rejects a bright-line approach based on formal sovereignty 
on separation-of-powers grounds. Justice Kennedy reasons: 
The necessary implication of the [government’s] argument is that by 
surrendering formal sovereignty over any unincorporated territory to a third 
party, while at the same time entering into a lease that grants total control over 
the territory back to the United States, it would be possible for the political 
 
 99. Id. The majority emphasizes the idiosyncrasy of the cases before it while at the same time 
suggesting that these cases could have analogs by using the phrases “like the one the Department of 
Defense has used” and “like Guantanamo.” Id. (emphasis added). But see id. at 2251 (referring to “the 
unique status of Guantanamo Bay”). 
 100. Id. at 2250; see also id. at 2255 (emphasizing the practical considerations that influenced 
later cases). 
 101. Id. at 2250. 
 102. Id. at 2251. 
 103. Id. at 2253. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 2257. 
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branches to govern without legal constraint . . . . The test for determining the 
scope of [the writ of habeas corpus] must not be subject to manipulation by 
those whose power it is designed to restrain.106 
This concern flows from the susceptibility of a country approach to government 
policies designed to keep individuals quite literally beyond the reach of 
domestic rights provisions. Indeed, there are indications that the Executive 
initially opted to detain individuals at Guantanamo Bay at least in part for this 
reason.107 
In lieu of a country approach, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in 
Boumediene directly invokes the “impracticable and anomalous” standard from 
the Harlan concurrence in Reid and from Justice Kennedy’s own concurrence 
in Verdugo108 to support its application of a “functional” approach to 
extraterritoriality. In the end, the majority identifies “at least three factors” 
relevant to determining the scope of constitutional habeas: “(1) the citizenship 
and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that 
status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension 
and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in 
resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.”109 The majority thus explicitly 
enshrines elements of all three approaches in its multifactor test: (1) citizenship 
and status, focusing on the relationship between the government and the 
individual (compact); (2) nature of the sites of apprehension and detention, 
focusing on territory (country); and (3) practical obstacles, focusing on 
contextual factors without drawing bright lines based on territory or 
membership (conscience). 
The question is how these three approaches will interact in cases 
involving detainees held in other locations.110 In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy 
echoed his observation in Rasul that “Guantanamo Bay is in every practical 
respect a United States territory,”111 and he concluded that “[i]n every practical 
sense Guantanamo is not abroad.”112 This left room for the Boumediene 
majority to differentiate other habeas petitions, such as those filed by detainees 
at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan, without deciding them: 
 
 106. Id. at 2258-59. 
 107. Justice Scalia’s dissent in Boumediene states that “the President’s Office of Legal Counsel 
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 111. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 112. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261 (citing Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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While obligated to abide by the terms of the lease, the United States is, for all 
practical purposes, answerable to no other sovereign for its acts on the 
[Guantanamo] base. Were that not the case, or if the detention facility were 
located in an active theater of war, arguments that issuing the writ would be 
“impracticable or anomalous” would have more weight.113 
This left the door open for the government to argue that the Boumediene 
holding was, in fact, limited exclusively to Guantanamo. 
In a May 2010 opinion applying Boumediene to petitions filed by 
detainees at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan, the D.C. Circuit 
emphasized the “practical obstacles” to allowing these detainees to file habeas 
petitions and declined to find jurisdiction over their petitions largely on that 
basis.114 Although the D.C. Circuit did not find that territorial location was 
determinative, it concluded that habeas jurisdiction did not extend to detainees 
“in an active theater of war in a territory under neither the de facto nor de jure 
sovereignty of the United States and within the territory of another de jure 
sovereign.”115 The district court had previously held that a Bagram detainee 
who was an Afghan citizen could not file a habeas petition because of “unique 
‘practical obstacles’ in the form of friction with the ‘host’ country,”116 but it 
would have found jurisdiction over the habeas petitions of non-Afghan 
detainees. This illustrates the subjectivity involved in applying the “practical 
obstacles” test. That said, although Justice Kennedy’s functional approach 
preserves more judicial discretion to extend domestic rights provisions than a 
categorical approach, it has not resulted in the wholesale extension of 
constitutional rights to noncitizens overseas. 
2. Suing U.S. Officials 
Although the habeas petitions filed by detainees have garnered the most 
attention, civil suits also have been filed in U.S. courts as a means of seeking 
redress for extraterritorial violations of U.S. and international law. Courts 
confronting these cases also must determine whether certain provisions of the 
U.S. Constitution apply to noncitizens outside the territorial United States. Four 
such cases brought in 2005 were consolidated by the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation under the caption In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees 
Litigation, and were transferred for pretrial proceedings to Chief Judge Thomas 
Hogan of the D.C. District Court. Judge Hogan dismissed the cases.117 Notably, 
 
 113. Id. at 2261-62. 
 114. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 115. Id. at 98. 
 116. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009). The Afghan detainee’s 
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Judge Hogan found that the plaintiffs could not pursue a Bivens remedy for 
their detention and mistreatment, even though “the facts alleged in the 
plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint stand as an indictment of the humanity with 
which the United States treats its detainees.”118 
Bivens causes of action can be created by federal courts against federal 
officials who violate individuals’ constitutional rights. However, government 
officials benefit from qualified immunity from civil liability “‘insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.’”119 The “clearly established” 
standard presents a significant doctrinal hurdle for foreign plaintiffs seeking 
civil damages for extraterritorial violations of constitutional rights under 
Bivens. 
Relying largely on Eisentrager, Judge Hogan found that the Iraqi and 
Afghan plaintiffs had failed to assert a right protected by the Constitution.120 
Judge Hogan emphasized that “what must be ‘clearly established’ is the 
constitutional right,” not simply that torture is unlawful.121 This is because “a 
Bivens remedy is available only for constitutional violations, not for violations 
of some other source of law, such as international law or treaties.”122 Critically, 
in Judge Hogan’s view, “Supreme Court precedent at the time the plaintiffs 
were injured established that the Fifth Amendment [right to due process] did 
not apply to nonresident aliens outside the sovereign territory of the United 
States.”123 Anticipating Justice Scalia’s dissent in Boumediene, Judge Hogan 
said the following about the plaintiffs’ proposed “impracticable and 
anomalous” test: “As one defendant observed, ‘plaintiffs attempt to create 
binding Supreme Court precedent based solely on a footnote, citing to a 
concurring opinion that cites to yet another concurring opinion.’ This Court 
agrees.”124 
Ultimately, as recounted above, this very footnote from Justice Stevens’s 
majority opinion in Rasul, citing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Verdugo, 
which in turn cited Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Reid, did provide much of 
the doctrinal basis for the Boumediene majority’s adoption of the 
“impracticable and anomalous” standard at the heart of its functional test. 
However, as long as judges determine qualified immunity based on whether a 
right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation, this 
development will provide little comfort to those allegedly injured by U.S. 
action prior to 2008.125 The Boumediene majority’s characterization of 
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Guantanamo Bay as “not abroad” has also failed to benefit plaintiffs who have 
brought claims under the Alien Tort Statute against U.S. officials for their 
alleged violations of international (as opposed to constitutional) law.126 
Guantanamo still is “abroad” for all but limited purposes, notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court’s rejection of a pure country approach. 
B. Canada 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has been the touchstone 
for judicial review of legislative and executive action in Canada since 1982. By 
its terms, the Charter applies 
a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within 
the authority of Parliament . . . ; and 
b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters 
within the authority of the legislature of each province.127 
The two leading Supreme Court cases interpreting the territorial scope of 
Charter guarantees are R. v. Cook128 and R. v. Hape.129 Although Hape did not 
explicitly overrule Cook, it did entrench a substantially more restrictive 
approach to the geographic reach of the Charter. This approach subsequently 
has been applied by lower courts in cases including Amnesty International 
Canada v. Canada (Chief of the Defence Staff),130 and by the Supreme Court 
itself in Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr (2008) (Khadr I)131 and Canada 
(Justice) v. Khadr (2010) (Khadr II).132 
Canadian jurisprudence has moved from an assertion of nationality 
jurisdiction over the conduct of Canadian officials acting abroad (Cook) to a 
much more restrictive view of the extraterritorial application of the Charter 
only in circumstances of explicit consent by the territorial state (Hape) or to 
mitigate international law violations (Khadr I). The Khadr cases illustrate the 
potentially unintended gaps in protection left by the Hape decision, which 
adopts a more restrictive view of the Charter’s geographic scope than is 
required by the Court’s decision in Cook or by international law. The Canadian 
Charter explicitly subjects the rights it extends to “such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.”133 Yet Hape instructed lower courts to refrain categorically from 
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applying the Charter to extraterritorial government action, even vis-à-vis 
Canadian citizens, in all but exceptional circumstances. Under Hape, Canada 
has the benefit of a bright-line rule embodied in the country approach, but its 
mechanism for addressing egregious violations (by deeming the Charter to 
apply where there have been clear violations of international law) is circuitous 
and has perplexed some lower courts. It would be preferable to formulate 
guidelines permitting a contextual evaluation of when to extend certain Charter 
constraints to extraterritorial government action, rather than relying on a bright-
line rule combined with an ambiguous exception. 
1. Comity and Deference 
The Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Cook arose from the trial 
of a U.S. citizen, Deltonia Cook, for the murder of a Vancouver taxi cab driver. 
Cook was arrested in the United States pursuant to an extradition request by 
Canada. While he was detained at a New Orleans prison, he was interviewed by 
two Vancouver police detectives. At his trial in Canada, Cook argued that a 
statement he made to these detectives denying involvement in the murder 
should not be admitted for the purpose of impeaching his credibility on cross-
examination, because the detectives did not adequately advise him of his right 
to counsel as required by section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter.134 The 
divisional court admitted the statement. Cook was convicted, and appealed. 
Seven out of nine justices found that the Vancouver detectives breached section 
10(b) of the Charter when they interviewed Cook in New Orleans and did not 
clearly inform him of his right to counsel prior to questioning him, and that 
Cook’s statement should therefore have been excluded.135 
Nine years later, Lawrence Hape, a Canadian citizen, was tried in Canada 
for laundering money through an investment company in the Turks and Caicos 
Islands. RCMP officers from Canada conducted a warrantless perimeter search 
of the company, which they understood to be permissible under Turks and 
Caicos law even though it is not permitted under the Charter. They also 
conducted covert entries in March 1998 and February 1999 that they 
understood to be authorized by warrants issued in the Turks and Caicos, 
although no warrants were admitted into evidence at Hape’s trial.136 At all 
times, the RCMP officers acted with the permission and under the authority of 
a Turks and Caicos police superintendent.137 Mr. Hape objected to the 
introduction of documents seized from the investment company during these 
covert entries on the grounds that the RCMP’s activities violated section 8 of 
 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 1 (U.K.). 
 134. Section 24(2) of the Charter provides for the exclusion of evidence “obtained in a manner 
that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter” if “the admission of [the 
evidence] in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.” Even if the 
Charter did not apply to the actions of the Canadian detectives, Charter Sections 7 and 11(d), taken 
together, permit the exclusion of evidence that would render the trial unfair. Id. c. 11; see R. v. Cook, 
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 597, para. 22. 
 135. R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597, para. 22. 
 136. R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, paras. 5-11, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, paras. 5-11. 
 137. Id. para. 3. 
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the Charter, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. The divisional 
court admitted the documents. Hape was convicted and appealed. This time, all 
nine justices agreed that the documents seized in the Turks and Caicos were 
properly admitted at trial. 
Only one of the five justices who joined the majority opinion in Cook, 
Justice Binnie, was still on the Court at the time Hape was decided. Justice 
Binnie concurred in the majority’s judgment in Hape, but he did not join the 
majority’s reasons. The Hape majority included one of the Cook dissenters, 
Chief Justice McLachlin, and four justices who were not on the Court at the 
time Cook was decided. Justice Bastarache, who has since retired from the 
Court, wrote concurring reasons in both Cook and Hape. Although Hape is now 
controlling law in Canada, it is worthwhile to note the shift in reasoning that 
has occurred since Cook was decided, along with the shift in the Court’s 
composition. 
In Cook, seven out of nine justices found that the Vancouver detectives 
breached section 10(b) of the Charter when they interviewed the suspect in 
New Orleans without properly advising him of his right to counsel. Five of the 
seven analyzed the problem by reasoning that the Canadian detectives were 
governed by the Canadian Charter because of their Canadian nationality, even 
though the interview took place in the United States.138 The other two justices 
agreed with this conclusion,139 but would have focused more on the relative 
roles of the Canadian and U.S. authorities in the interview to determine whether 
Canada’s extension of the Charter to the detectives’ actions was warranted in 
the circumstances.140 Only the two dissenters attributed significance to the U.S. 
citizenship of the accused, advocating elements of a compact-based approach 
that would exclude aliens subject to extraterritorial government action from the 
protection of the Charter.141 However, since the parties did not put forward 
arguments based on Cook’s nationality, even the dissenters focused on whether 
the Charter could control the actions of the Canadian detectives, rather than 
whether the affected individual (Cook) could assert Charter rights.142 
Justice Bastarache, who concurred in the judgment in Cook, wrote 
separately to emphasize that “the status of a police officer as an officer of the 
state is not altered by crossing a jurisdictional border, even if he or she is 
deprived of all the coercive powers conferred by the home state.”143 In his 
view, “[T]he key issue in cases of cooperation between Canadian officials and 
foreign officials exercising their statutory powers is determining who was in 
 
 138. Cook, 2 S.C.R. 597, paras. 28, 41, 46, 48 (Cory and Iacobucci, JJ.). These Justices 
implicitly viewed the breach as occurring during the interview, rather than when the statement was used 
for impeachment at trial. 
 139. Id. para. 122 (Bastarache, J., concurring). 
 140. Id. paras. 125-26. 
 141. Id. paras. 81, 85-86 (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., dissenting). The majority did note that “it is 
reasonable to permit the appellant, who is being made to adhere to Canadian criminal law and 
procedure, to claim Canadian constitutional rights relating to the interview conducted by the Canadian 
detectives in New Orleans,” but it did not emphasize this line of reasoning. Id. para. 51 (Cory and 
Iacobucci, JJ.). 
 142. Id. paras. 87-88 (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. para. 120 (Bastarache, J., concurring). 
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control of the specific feature of the investigation which is alleged to constitute 
the Charter breach.”144 In this case, the Charter applied to the Canadian 
detectives in New Orleans because “the foreign officials invited the Canadian 
officials to conduct their questioning in an entirely autonomous fashion.”145 
Only the dissenters argued that any extraterritorial law enforcement 
activity necessarily occurs under the authority of a foreign state and therefore 
falls outside the terms of section 32 of the Charter. As Justice L’Heureux-Dubé 
wrote in dissent: 
When officials of a s. 32 government participate in an action that falls under the 
legal authority of a foreign government, it is not a matter “within the authority” 
of Parliament or a provincial legislature, as required by s. 32 . . . . [T]he 
Charter does not apply to any investigation where Canadian officials no longer 
have the legal attributes of “government”; this occurs whenever an 
investigation takes place under the sovereignty of another government.146 
For Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, even Justice Bastarache’s more limited “control” 
test would be inappropriate, because “[o]n territory under foreign sovereignty, 
the Canadian government no longer has authority, and Canadian officials, in 
the sense of having the coercive powers of the Canadian state behind them, are 
never really ‘controlling.’”147 This reasoning most closely reflects the country-
based approach that later prevailed in Hape, even though this is precisely the 
approach that Cook appeared to have rejected. 
Cook represents a relatively expansive interpretation of section 32, where 
the “authority” of Canadian state actors, and thus their Charter obligations, are 
deemed to travel with them across borders as long as this would not generate an 
“objectionable interference” with the foreign state’s authority, for example by 
purporting to govern the conduct of a foreign state’s own agents. Given that 
Cook was a U.S. citizen, it might seem that a Canadian citizen subject to the 
extraterritorial law enforcement activities of Canadian officials would have an 
even stronger claim to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Charter 
from a Canadian criminal trial. So one might have thought before the Hape 
decision in 2007. 
Nine years after Cook, all nine justices in Hape agreed that the documents 
seized by RCMP officers in the Turks and Caicos were properly admitted 
against a Canadian citizen at a Canadian trial.148 Writing for a majority, Justice 
LeBel adopted a country approach to the Canadian Charter.149 He found that 
 
 144. Id. para. 126. 
 145. Id. para. 128. 
 146. Id. para. 93 (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. para. 96. The dissent further concluded that “in this case the conduct of the Canadian 
detectives was not so serious that admission of the evidence would violate the appellant’s right to a fair 
trial, taking into account all the circumstances and society’s interest in finding out the truth.” Id. para. 
105. 
 148. Kent Roach criticizes what he calls the Hape majority’s “radical” approach, stating: “It 
does not build on or attempt to distinguish prior precedents in this area but rather rejects them, as a critic 
working outside of the system might do. This is not the way that judges should develop the law.” Kent 
W. Roach, R. v. Hape Creates Charter-Free Zones for Canadian Officials Abroad, 53 CRIM. L.Q. 1, 3 
(2007). 
 149. R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, para. 69, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, para. 69. 
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customary international law, which is automatically incorporated into Canadian 
law in the absence of conflicting legislation,150 prohibits the exercise of 
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction absent the explicit consent of the 
foreign state. Justice LeBel criticized the Cook majority for “fail[ing] to 
distinguish prescriptive from enforcement jurisdiction”151 when it found that 
the Canadian Charter applied to the Canadian detectives in New Orleans. He 
reasoned that “[t]he powers of prescription and enforcement are both necessary 
to application of the Charter.”152 Consequently, “Since extraterritorial 
enforcement is not possible [without consent], and enforcement is necessary for 
the Charter to apply, extraterritorial application of the Charter is 
impossible.”153 For Justice LeBel, when Canadian agents are acting under the 
legal authority of a foreign sovereign, even vis-à-vis a Canadian citizen, “the 
matter falls outside the authority of Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures,”154 and thus outside the scope of the Charter. 
Justice Bastarache, joined by two other justices, again advanced his 
“control” theory of the extraterritorial Charter,155 which again failed to attract a 
majority. In his concurrence, he emphasized that “[s]ection 32(1) of the 
Charter defines who acts, not where they act.”156 Unlike the interview in Cook, 
foreign officials took part in the search and seizure in Hape. Justice Bastarache 
would therefore have held that “[w]here the host state takes part in the action 
by subjecting Canadian authorities to its laws, the Charter still applies to 
Canadian officers[,] but there will be no Charter violation where the Canadian 
officers abide by the laws of the host state”157 unless “it is shown that those 
laws or procedures are substantially inconsistent with the fundamental 
principles emanating from the Charter.”158 For Justice Bastarache, the Charter 
remains the appropriate touchstone for the conduct of Canadian officials 
participating in extraterritorial law enforcement activities, and for the review of 
those activities by Canadian courts: “I believe it is preferable to frame the 
fundamental rights obligations of Canadian officials working abroad in a 
context that officers are already expected to be familiar with—their obligations 
under the Charter.”159 Justice Bastarache’s approach comes the closest to a 
conscience model, because it does not turn on the location of the search or the 
 
 150. Id. para. 39. 
 151. Id. para. 83. In fact, Hape, not Cook, misconceptualizes enforcement jurisdiction, as 
Pierre-Hugues Verdier, among others, has pointed out. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, International 
Decision: R. v. Hape, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 143, 147 (2008); see also John H. Currie, Comment, Khadr’s 
Twist on Hape: Tortured Determinations of the Extraterritorial Reach of the Canadian Charter, 42 CAN. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 307, 317-18 (2008). 
 152. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, para. 85. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. para. 69. 
 155. Id. para. 154 (Bastarache, J., concurring); see also Michel Bastarache, La Charte 
canadienne des droits et libertés, reflet d’un phénomène mondial? [Does the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms Reflect a Global Phenomenon?], 48 CAHIERS DE DROIT 735, 742-44 (2007) (Fr.). 
 156. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, para. 161; see also R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597, para. 118 (Can.) 
(Bastarache, J., concurring). 
 157. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, para. 176 (Bastarache, J., concurring). 
 158. Id. para. 174. 
 159. Id. para. 173. 
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nationality of the suspect. Even so, it is still narrower than the approach 
adopted by the majority in Cook. 
Mindful of the potential implications of the Hape majority’s adoption of a 
country-based approach, Justice Binnie concurred in the judgment but wrote 
separately to reject the majority’s “premature pronouncements”160 restricting 
the ability of the Charter to protect Canadian citizens from extraterritorial 
government action. In his view, the majority’s approach “effectively overrules 
Cook”161 by finding that “any extraterritorial effect [of the Charter] is 
objectionable.”162 He would have reached the same result by applying Cook to 
find that enforcing a warrant requirement in these circumstances would have 
generated an objectionable extraterritorial effect by interfering with the 
sovereign authority of the Turks and Caicos.163 Justice Binnie would therefore 
have preserved the privileged role of the Charter in protecting rights, especially 
“as between the Canadian government and Canadian citizens,”164 as 
emphasized by a compact approach. 
The central problem with the majority’s rationale in Hape is that it 
misconceptualizes the application of the Charter to Canadian officials acting 
abroad as an exercise of enforcement jurisdiction, rather than prescriptive 
jurisdiction.165 Although the majority’s result in admitting the evidence might 
have been warranted (no pun intended) for other reasons, its rationale is not 
supported by the international law standards it invoked. 
The majority’s approach illustrates how the deference to foreign authority 
reflected in a country-based approach radically circumscribes the role of 
domestic judicial review. The majority recognized the importance of 
intergovernmental cooperation in transnational law enforcement, and was likely 
concerned that the imposition of Canadian standards would interfere with the 
effectiveness of that cooperation, either symbolically (by showing inadequate 
regard for local law) or practically (because of logistical obstacles to 
compliance). For the majority, “[W]hen one state looks to another for help in 
criminal matters, it must respect the way in which the other state chooses to 
provide the assistance within its borders,”166 even when Canadian agents are 
directly involved. Consequently, “Without evidence of consent [by the Turks 
and Caicos to the extraterritorial enforcement of the Canadian Charter], that is 
enough to conclude that the Charter does not apply.”167 This requirement of 
 
 160. Id. para. 183 (Binnie, J., concurring); see also id. para. 187. 
 161. Id. para. 182. 
 162. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 163. Id. para. 181 (finding that “superimposing the Canadian law of search and seizure on top 
of that of the Turks and Caicos Islands would be unworkable”). 
 164. Id. para. 186. 
 165. See id. paras. 69, 115 (majority opinion). It is unclear, following this rationale, what basis 
remains for Canada’s criminalization of certain extraterritorial conduct absent the express consent of the 
territorial state. See, e.g., LAURA BARNETT, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF DOMESTIC CRIMINAL 
LAW: EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND EXTRADITION (2008), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/
LOP/researchpublications/prb0117-e.pdf (enumerating Canadian statutes that criminalize extraterritorial 
conduct based on the nationality principle, the protective principle, and universal jurisdiction). 
 166. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, para. 52. 
 167. Id. para. 115. 
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“consent” is not only difficult to put into effect, but it also puts the question of 
whether a domestic rights regime constrains the actions of that country’s 
government agents in the hands of a foreign government. 
The Hape majority does stop short of endorsing a “no holds barred” 
approach to extraterritorial law enforcement activities: “That deference [to 
foreign sovereigns] ends where clear violations of international law and 
fundamental human rights begin.”168 Under this framework, the outer limits of 
permissible action by Canadian agents abroad are defined first by local law, 
then by international law, which establishes a threshold that can trigger the 
exceptional extraterritorial application of the Charter.169 In his concurrence, 
Justice Binnie expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of international 
human rights law as a substitute for the Charter under this framework, 
reasoning that “[t]he content of such obligations is weaker and their scope is 
more debatable than Charter guarantees.”170 
Although animated by understandable concerns, the majority’s country-
based approach in Hape led it to draw sweeping conclusions about the 
territorially limited nature of the Charter that neglect the Charter’s special role 
in defining core aspects of the Canadian polity, including the relationship 
between the government and governed (emphasized by a compact approach) 
and a set of fundamental values (emphasized by a conscience approach).171 
The implications of Hape’s country approach became apparent in 
Amnesty International v. Canada, in which petitioners invoked the Charter to 
challenge the actions of Canadian forces abroad.172 In that case, Amnesty 
International Canada and the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association were 
granted public interest standing to challenge Canada’s practice of transferring 
individuals captured and detained by Canadian forces in Afghanistan into the 
custody of Afghan forces, on the grounds that these individuals are thereby 
exposed to a substantial risk of torture. In addition to various forms of 
injunctive relief, the applicants sought a declaration “that sections 7, 10 and 12 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms apply to individuals detained 
by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.”173 These Charter provisions establish 
the right not to be deprived of “life, liberty and security . . . . except in 
accordance with principles of fundamental justice[;]”174 the right to challenge 
the lawfulness of one’s detention;175 and “the right not to be subjected to cruel 
 
 168. Id. para. 52. Although “deference” in this sentence refers to deference to local authorities, 
it could also, by extension, suggest that courts should be less deferential to the political branches where 
“clear violations” are involved. 
 169. Id. para. 90. 
 170. Id. para. 186 (Binnie, J., concurring). 
 171. See, e.g., Roach, supra note 148, at 4 (criticizing the decision in Hape as insufficiently 
attentive to the role of the Charter in defining and expressing Canadian values). 
 172. Amnesty Int’l Can. v. Canada (Chief of the Def. Staff), 2008 FC 336, para. 4, [2008] 4 
F.C.R. 546, para. 4, aff’d 2008 FCA 401, [2009] 4 F.C.R. 149. 
 173. Id. para. 8. 
 174. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 7 (U.K.). 
 175. Id. § 10. 
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and unusual treatment or punishment.”176 The trial judge, Justice Mactavish, 
found that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hape compelled dismissal. Although 
Afghanistan had clearly consented to the Canadian Forces’ detention of non-
Canadians, including Afghan citizens, in Afghanistan,177 Justice Mactavish 
determined that Afghanistan had not consented to the extraterritorial 
application of Canadian law.178 She reasoned: 
[I]t is clear that while Afghanistan has consented to its citizens being detained 
by the Canadian Forces for the purposes described by the Afghanistan Compact 
[concluded on February 1, 2006], it cannot be said that Afghanistan has 
consented to the application or enforcement of Canadian law, including the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to constrain the actions of the 
Canadian Forces in relation to detainees held by the Canadian Forces on 
Afghan soil. 
Furthermore, the Government of Afghanistan has not consented to 
having Canadian Charter rights conferred on non-Canadians, within its 
territorial limits.179 
She further observed that “the majority decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Hape specifically rejected the control-based test that had been 
advocated by Justice Bastarache in Cook as a means of grounding the 
extraterritorial application of the Charter.”180 Consequently, following Hape, 
the rights of detainees in Canadian custody are defined by the Afghan 
constitution and by international law, including international humanitarian law, 
not by the Canadian Charter.181 In her view, even if the applicants established a 
substantial risk of human rights violations resulting from their transfer to 
Afghan custody, the Charter would not apply to the actions of the Canadian 
Forces.182 This is so, even though “the enforcement mechanisms for 
[international law] standards may not be as robust as those available under the 
Charter,”183 which is, at least in part, what led the applicants to seek relief 
under the Charter in the first place. 
Less than three months after the trial court’s decision in Amnesty 
International, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Canada v. Khadr 
(Khadr I).184 In Khadr I, a unanimous Court invoked the human rights 
exception in Hape to apply the Charter to the activities of Canadian intelligence 
officials who interviewed Omar Khadr in 2003 while he was detained by the 
 
 176. Id. § 12. 
 177. Amnesty Int’l Can., 2008 FC 336, para. 149. 
 178. Id. para. 159; see also id. para. 172. 
 179. Id. paras. 182-84. 
 180. Id. para. 282; see also id. para. 294 (indicating that “in Hape, the Supreme Court of 
Canada seemingly rejected Canadian control over activities taking place on foreign soil as a basis for 
extending Canadian Charter jurisdiction to protect individuals affected by those activities, in favour of 
its consent-based test”). 
 181. Id. paras. 161-62. 
 182. Id. para. 328. 
 183. Id. para. 338. The trial judge nevertheless emphasized that members of the Canadian 
Forces can face disciplinary sanctions and criminal prosecution under Canadian law for violating 
international humanitarian law standards, id. para. 344, as well as the possibility of prosecution by the 
International Criminal Court, id. para. 345. 
 184. Khadr I, 2008 SCC 28, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125. 
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United States at Guantanamo Bay. The Canadian officials then shared the 
resulting records and information with U.S. authorities for use in Khadr’s 
eventual prosecution by a U.S. military commission.185 The Court in Khadr I 
applied precisely the approach that the trial judge in Amnesty International 
deemed an illogical and implausible reading of Hape—namely, finding that the 
Charter applies extraterritorially when Canadian officials act in violation of 
international law, but not otherwise.186 
Under Khadr I, the Charter defines the remedy for Canada’s participation 
in a process that violated international law. The Khadr I Court held: 
The process in place [at Guantanamo] at the time Canadian officials 
interviewed Mr. Khadr and passed the fruits of the interviews on to U.S. 
officials has been found by the United States Supreme Court to violate U.S. 
domestic law and international human rights obligations to which Canada is 
party. In light of these decisions . . . the comity concerns that would normally 
justify deference to foreign law do not apply in this case. Consequently, the 
Charter applies, and Canada is under a s. 7 duty of disclosure.187 
The Court also explained that “if Canada was participating in a process that 
was violative of Canada’s binding obligations under international law, the 
Charter applies to the extent of that participation.”188 
Although the Court characterized Canada’s provision of information to 
U.S. authorities as a violation of Canada’s international law obligations,189 it 
identified the relevant Charter breach as Canada’s subsequent refusal to 
disclose that information to Khadr.190 The Court held that “to mitigate the 
effect” of its participation in illegal U.S. processes, Canada was required to 
disclose to Khadr “information given to U.S. authorities as a direct 
consequence of Canada’s having interviewed him . . . . subject to the balancing 
 
 185. Khadr, a Canadian citizen, was taken prisoner in Afghanistan on July 27, 2002, when he 
was fifteen years old, and transferred to Guantanamo Bay. Id. para. 5. On October 25, 2010, Khadr 
entered a guilty plea before a U.S. military commission in exchange for an eight-year sentence, with one 
year to be served at Guantanamo and the rest in Canada. See Guantanamo Bay’s Youngest Militant 
Omar Khadr Jailed, BBC NEWS (Oct. 31, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-
11662961; Adam Levine, Canada Says It Will Accept Guantanamo Detainee Khadr in a Year, CNN 
(Nov. 1, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-01/world/canada.khadr_1_guantanamo-detainee-omar-
khadr-youngest-detainee?_s=PM:WORLD. 
 186. See Amnesty Int’l Can., 2008 FC 336, paras. 310-11.  
 187. Khadr I, 2008 SCC 28, para. 3. Section 7 of the Charter has been interpreted as entitling 
criminal defendants to “disclosure of the information in the hands of the Crown.” Id. para. 16. 
 188. Id. para. 19; see also id. para. 27 (holding that “at the time Canada handed over the fruits 
of the interviews to U.S. officials, it was bound by the Charter, because at that point it became a 
participant in a process that violated Canada’s international obligations”). As Benjamin Berger has 
pointed out, the Khadr Court did not engage in its own analysis of the international lawfulness of 
detention and trial at Guantanamo Bay, but instead relied on U.S. Supreme Court rulings. Benjamin L. 
Berger, The Reach of Rights in the Security State: Reflections on Khadr v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 
56 CRIM. REP. (6th) 268, 270-71 (2008). The same is true of the second Khadr decision rendered in 
2010. See Khadr II, 2010 SCC 3, para. 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44, para. 16. If relevant U.S. decisions did 
not exist or had reached a different conclusion, Berger finds it difficult to envision circumstances in 
which a Canadian court would “adjudg[e] a foreign legal system as, in part, illegal at international law” 
in light of the “comity and sovereignty” concerns that were deemed paramount in Hape. Berger, supra, 
at 270-71. In order for this to happen, conscience-based reasoning would have to prevail over country-
based reasoning, as it ultimately did in the death penalty jurisprudence described below. See infra notes 
204-226 and accompanying text. 
 189. Khadr I, 2008 SCC 28, para. 32. 
 190. Id. para. 33. 
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of national security and other considerations” under the relevant provisions of 
the Canada Evidence Act by the designated federal court judge.191 
In a sequel to the first Khadr appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada 
granted expedited review of another case involving Omar Khadr.192 In that 
case, the trial judge held that Khadr was entitled to a judicial order requiring 
the government of Canada to seek his repatriation from Guantanamo Bay.193 A 
divided court of appeal affirmed this decision.194 The Supreme Court agreed 
that Canada had infringed Khadr’s section 7 rights under the Charter (the right 
not to be deprived of life, liberty, and security except in accordance with 
principles of fundamental justice), but determined that the appropriate remedy 
was to grant a declaration of infringement, not to order the government to 
request Khadr’s repatriation.195 
As an international legal matter, the remedy of requesting repatriation, 
which would be available to Khadr based on his Canadian nationality, seems to 
fall within the realm of diplomatic protection, rather than an assertion of 
Charter rights vis-à-vis the Canadian government. This interpretation is 
consistent with the trial court’s and the Supreme Court’s citation to the South 
African case of Kaunda v. RSA,196 in which a group of South African citizens 
detained in Zimbabwe and facing extradition to Equatorial Guinea sought a 
court order compelling the South African government to intervene on their 
behalf. In this respect, the dissenting appeals court judge in Khadr II made a 
valid point when he indicated that he “[could] not see the link between the 
inappropriateness of the interviews and the remedy of repatriation.”197 The 
opacity of this link can be attributed in large part to the circuitous reasoning 
involved in applying Hape to a request for diplomatic protection which, in turn, 
arises from the conceptual incoherence of relying on an international law 
violation to trigger the extraterritorial application of the Charter. 
It is unclear how much effect the Khadr cases are having in mitigating the 
country approach taken by the majority in Hape. For example, even with the 
benefit of the Supreme Court’s analysis of the international law exception in 
Khadr I, the appeals court in Amnesty International v. Canada affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment and held that the Charter did not apply to the activities of 
Canadian forces stationed there.198 The appeals court based its conclusion on 
 
 191. Id. paras. 34, 37; see also id. para. 35 (stating that “to the extent that Canada has 
participated in that process, it has a constitutional duty to disclose information obtained by that 
participation to a Canadian citizen whose liberty is at stake”). Although Canadian officials presumably 
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about the extraterritorial scope of the Charter in the circumstances of this case. 
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 194. Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2009 FCA 246, [2010] 1 F.C.R. 73. 
 195. Khadr II, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44. 
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the fact that, following the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) in Banković v. Belgium,199 Canada did not have “effective control” of 
Afghan territory.200 It is unclear why the appeals court deemed it proper to 
apply the ECHR’s Banković test to the extraterritorial application of the 
Canadian Charter, rather than following the Canadian Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Khadr I. In part, it could be that the Khadr I approach simply 
remains too puzzling. This might explain the appellate court’s statement, 
contrary to the language in Hape and Khadr I, that although “deference and 
comity end where clear violations of international law and fundamental rights 
begin,” that exception “does not mean that the Charter then applies as a 
consequence of these violations.”201 Given this confusion, and the Supreme 
Court’s attempts to mitigate the impact of its country approach, it appears clear 
that, as Gib van Ert has suggested, “Hape will surely have to be revisited one 
day.”202 
2. Asserting Fundamental Values 
When Hape is revisited, it might be useful for the Supreme Court to recall 
its analysis in another line of cases that could also be conceptualized as giving 
extraterritorial effect to Charter guarantees, which the Court referenced in 
Khadr II on the specific question of remedies.203 These cases ask whether the 
Charter protects individuals who are subject to extradition by Canada to 
countries that continue to apply the death penalty. In these cases, the Canadian 
Supreme Court has moved from a more deferential, country-based mode of 
reasoning to a conscience-based approach, which is the inverse of its 
progression from Cook to Hape. To a large extent, this shift seems attributable 
to the Court’s perception of and sensitivity to a growing international 
consensus against the death penalty. It is unclear whether the death penalty 
cases are sui generis, or whether they can be read to suggest a hierarchy of 
rights, some of which (such as the right against warrantless searches) might be 
curtailed in the name of comity, but others (such as the right not to be deprived 
of life except in accordance with principles of fundamental justice) will be 
enforced in the name of fundamental Canadian values. 
The Canadian Supreme Court’s movement toward a more expansive 
approach to the application of the Charter in death penalty extradition cases can 
be traced from its 1991 opinion in Kindler v. Canada204 to its opinion ten years 
later in United States v. Burns.205 Both cases involved the extradition of 
individuals to face trial in the United States on charges that could carry the 
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death penalty. In Kindler, a majority declined to interfere with the extradition 
of a fugitive who had fled to Canada after a Pennsylvania jury had found him 
guilty of first-degree murder, among other offenses, and recommended the 
death penalty. The majority found that the Canadian Minister of Justice’s 
decision to order the appellant’s extradition without seeking assurances from 
the United States that the death penalty would not be imposed did not violate 
the appellant’s rights under section 7 (the right not to be deprived of life, 
liberty, and security of the person except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice) or section 12 (the right not to be subjected to any cruel and 
unusual treatment or punishment). 
Seven justices heard the Kindler case, and four of them wrote opinions. 
Two of the dissenting justices urged the importance of deciding the case 
according to “Canadian traditions and values.”206 In their view, “Although the 
Charter has no extraterritorial application, persons in Canada who are subject to 
extradition proceedings must be accorded all the rights which flow from the 
Charter.”207 Because Canada’s actions could result in the appellant’s execution, 
“To surrender a fugitive who may be subject to the death penalty violates s. 12 of 
the Charter just as surely as would the execution of the fugitive in Canada.”208 For 
three justices in the majority, by contrast, no Charter rights were implicated in 
these circumstances because the Canadian government would not itself be 
imposing the death penalty. Justice La Forest emphasized on their behalf: 
The execution, if it ultimately takes place, will be in the United States under 
American law against an American citizen in respect of an offence that took 
place in the United States. It does not result from any initiative taken by the 
Canadian Government. Canada’s connection with the matter results from the 
fact that the fugitive came here of his own free will, and the question to be 
determined is whether the action of the Canadian Government in returning him 
to his own country infringes his liberty and security in an impermissible way.209 
Justice La Forest’s reasoning emphasized the lack of connection between 
Canada and the harm alleged. For him, whether Canadian society accepts the 
death penalty is simply “not the issue.”210 He declined to view “the fugitive” as 
a beneficiary of the Canadian Charter, even though Kindler was subject to the 
coercive authority of Canadian officials in extraditing him to the United 
States.211 
Two of the justices who signed this opinion also joined a separate opinion 
written by Justice McLachlin (who is now the Chief Justice). Justice 
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McLachlin’s opinion emphasized that extradition by its nature “is founded on 
the concepts of reciprocity, comity and respect for differences in other 
jurisdictions.”212 In her view, applying the Charter to the extradition procedure 
here would result in the impermissible extraterritorial imposition of Charter 
guarantees on criminal proceedings in a foreign country.213 Moreover, because 
the extradited fugitive would not face “a situation that is shocking and 
fundamentally unacceptable to our society,”214 deferring to the executive’s 
decision to extradite without assurances would not violate section 7 principles 
of fundamental justice.215 This was true, she reasoned in 1991, in part because 
“[t]here is no clear consensus in [Canada] that capital punishment is morally 
abhorrent and absolutely unacceptable.”216 The different justices’ conclusions 
about the application of the Charter in Kindler appear to have been closely tied 
to their assessment of the strength of opposition to the death penalty itself. 
Ten years after Kindler, the Court revisited its holding. In a per curiam 
opinion in United States v. Burns, all nine justices agreed that extradition to 
face the death penalty uniquely implicates “basic constitutional values,”217 and 
that extradition without assurances violates section 7 of the Charter in all but 
“exceptional” cases.218 Although the fugitives in Burns sought to distinguish 
Kindler on the basis that they, unlike Kindler, were Canadian citizens,219 the 
Court did not find this factor dispositive. Instead, it engaged in more expansive 
reasoning to find that the Charter constrains the Justice Minister’s discretion to 
extradite individuals without assurances that the requesting state will not 
impose or carry out the death penalty.220 The Court chose not to focus on the 
section 12 right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment and 
punishment and the question of whether Canada’s role in extraditing an 
individual to face the death penalty is sufficiently causally connected to the 
ultimate imposition of that penalty to incur state responsibility for such 
treatment.221 Instead, the Court focused on the section 7 right not to be deprived 
of life except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.222 It 
emphasized that “[t]he death penalty has been rejected as an acceptable element 
of criminal justice by the Canadian people, speaking through their elected 
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federal representatives, after years of protracted debate,”223 and that Canada has 
taken a proactive position in international relations in advocating abolition of 
the death penalty.224 The Court explained: “Assurances are not sought out of 
regard for the respondents, but out of regard for the principles that have 
historically guided this country’s criminal justice system and are presently 
reflected in its international stance on capital punishment.”225 This reasoning 
explicitly privileged “regard for . . . principles” over “regard for the 
respondents,” consistent with a conscience-based approach. 
In stark contrast to its restrained approach in Hape, the Court in Burns did 
not hesitate to project Canadian values into the international sphere. Although 
the Court could have focused on the territorial location of the extradition 
decision (country) or on the Canadian nationality of the fugitives (compact), it 
instead emphasized the incompatibility of the death penalty with Canadian 
values (conscience). The Burns Court found that Canadian opposition to the 
death penalty in both domestic and international fora trumped the competing 
territorial principle that local criminal law and punishment should apply in all 
but exceptional cases.226 
The conscience-based rationale in Burns stands in tension with the 
country approach in Hape. Moreover, Burns goes further than the international 
law exception set forth in Hape and applied in Khadr by suggesting that the 
Charter can be breached by action that facilitates the violation of Canadian 
principles of fundamental justice by a foreign government, even where the 
action by the Canadian or foreign government does not violate international 
law.227 Following this reasoning to its logical conclusion would have compelled 
a different result in the Amnesty International case, which the Supreme Court 
declined to review.228 
The relative absence of compact-based reasoning from the Canadian 
Supreme Court cases examined here stands in contrast to the central role of 
Canadian citizenship in a lower court case, Abdelrazik v. Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.229 Abousfian Abdelrazik, who was born in Sudan, became a naturalized 
Canadian citizen in 1995.230 In 2003, he travelled to Sudan, but was prevented 
from returning to Canada by a variety of factors including the expiration and 
nonrenewal of his Canadian passport.231 He was arrested, detained, and 
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allegedly tortured by Sudanese authorities, and also interrogated by Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service agents during his detention.232 Abdelrazik was 
listed as an associate of Al-Qaeda by the United Nations 1267 Committee and 
subjected to a global asset freeze and travel ban.233 He took refuge in the 
Canadian Embassy in Khartoum out of fear of further detention, but was unable 
to secure the assistance of the Canadian authorities in his attempts to return to 
Canada.234 Abdelrazik finally filed suit against the government of Canada, 
alleging that the government breached his Charter rights by “engag[ing] in a 
course of conduct designed to thwart his return to Canada.”235 
The trial court agreed that Abdelrazik’s Charter rights had been 
breached.236 It did not linger on the question of whether or not Abdelrazik was 
entitled to the protection of the Charter, because the provision he invoked 
explicitly states: “Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and 
leave Canada.”237 Because section 6(1) of the Charter applies to “every 
citizen,” the issue was not whether section 6(1) applied to Abdelrazik, but 
rather how Canada should reconcile its international and national obligations,238 
and how it should balance the roles of the executive and the judiciary.239 Even 
so, the trial court’s opinion, which does not cite Hape, does make compact-
based points in passing. For example, it asserts that “[w]hen the Government 
takes actions that are not in accordance with the law, and its actions affect a 
citizen, then that citizen is entitled to an effective remedy,”240 and it emphasizes 
that although Abdelrazik “is also a national and citizen of Sudan, he says that 
he considers Canada to be his home.”241 Although the court’s focus on 
citizenship in Abdelrazik was dictated largely by the wording of the Charter 
provision at issue, the compact-based language in that opinion shows what a 
compact approach to other Charter rights might look like. Such reasoning has 
not prevailed, or even played a significant role, in reasoning about the 
extraterritorial reach of the Charter in other contexts. 
Overall, Canadian jurisprudence is pulled between conscience and 
country approaches, with a country approach in the ascendancy outside of the 
death penalty context. The resulting jurisprudence provides a less robust set of 
Charter protections for citizens affected by extraterritorial government action 
than those provided to U.S. citizens under the U.S. Constitution. That said, both 
citizens and noncitizens can invoke the fundamental human rights exception to 
bring claims under the Charter in extreme circumstances. 
 
 232. Id. paras. 13-16. 
 233. Id. paras. 23, 26. 
 234. Id. paras. 30, 36. 
 235. Id. para. 2. 
 236. Id. para. 7. 
 237. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 6(1) (U.K.) (emphasis added). 
 238. Abdelrazik, 2009 FC 580, para. 4. 
 239. Id. para. 5. 
 240. Id. para. 6. 
 241. Id. para. 10. 
 96 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 36: 55 
 
C. The United Kingdom 
Although the United Kingdom does not have a codified constitution, the 
U.K. House of Lords (now the Supreme Court) has been called upon to 
determine the extraterritorial reach of domestic legislation designed to afford 
individuals certain protections and remedies vis-à-vis the U.K. government. In 
recent years, individuals affected by the actions of British forces in Iraq have 
brought claims under the Human Rights Act (HRA), which creates the 
domestic right to have public authorities act compatibly with rights articulated 
in the European Convention on Human Rights. Section 6(1) of the HRA 
provides that “[i]t is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is 
incompatible with a Convention right.”242 By virtue of this provision, 
individuals can seek judicial review of the actions of U.K. government agents 
in U.K. courts for compliance with the substantive provisions of the European 
Convention. 
Although claimants can also petition the ECHR in Strasbourg for redress 
(and still do if they do not receive satisfaction from the U.K. courts), the HRA 
was enacted in substantial part to prevent them from having to do so.243 From 
the perspective of this analysis, the U.K. House of Lords’s discussion of the 
extraterritorial application of the HRA offers a counterpoint to the U.S. and 
Canadian supreme courts’ discussions of the extraterritorial constraints on their 
governments contained in their respective domestic rights regimes. Of course, 
the HRA is different from the U.S. Constitution and the Canadian Charter in 
that it explicitly creates a domestic right to have public authorities act 
compatibly with a regional human rights convention. That said, judgments 
under the HRA do not simply parrot ECHR jurisprudence, and ECHR 
judgments are not binding authority on U.K. courts, even though a U.K. court 
“determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right 
must take into account any judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion 
of the [ECHR].”244 Claimants who are not satisfied with a U.K. judgment 
cannot appeal that judgment to the ECHR; rather, they must file a separate 
petition against the United Kingdom in the ECHR based on the same facts. 
Thus, although the House of Lords inevitably references the jurisprudence of 
the ECHR in discussing the extraterritorial application of the HRA, my focus 
here is not on the jurisprudence of the ECHR, but rather on what the House of 
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Lords and other U.K. courts have made of that jurisprudence. 
The analysis of U.K. cases on the extraterritorial application of the HRA 
shows a marked tendency to interpret ECHR decisions narrowly and apply 
country-based reasoning that emphasizes control over territory, rather than the 
link between the government and a particular individual. In Al-Skeini v. 
Secretary of State for Defence, for example, the U.K. House of Lords expressed 
the concern that, by construing the HRA too broadly, “the court would run the 
risk not only of colliding with the jurisdiction of other human rights bodies but 
of being accused of human rights imperialism.”245 Another factor driving U.K. 
courts toward a country-based model appears to be the persistent notion that 
extending the HRA to U.K. agents means importing U.K. law wholesale into 
foreign territory. In situations of occupation, there is no mandate or license to 
import a foreign legal regime.246 Whether the imperialism concerns expressed 
by courts are sincere or strategic, the fact remains that, as a whole, the national 
courts canvassed here have been reluctant to construe the geographic scope of 
rights regimes broadly.247 This is particularly interesting in light of the view 
that U.K. courts should construe Convention rights broadly rather than 
narrowly.248 Although the ECHR might reach a different conclusion in the 
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pending Al-Skeini case (and thus force U.K. courts to revisit their jurisprudence 
on this issue), national courts left to their own devices have rejected the claim 
that certain domestic constraints should apply should apply wherever, and with 
respect to whomever, a government acts. 
1. The Search for a “Jurisdictional Link” 
The central U.K. case testing the extraterritorial application of the HRA 
arose from the deaths of six Iraqi civilians in Basra during the British 
occupation of Iraq in 2003. The claimants in Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for 
Defence claimed that the Secretary of State for Defence violated Article 2(1) of 
the Convention, which protects the right to life and prohibits the intentional 
deprivation of life except following a lawful conviction.249 This right has been 
interpreted as requiring a public inquiry where a death has been caused by 
agents of the state in a manner that could be unlawful under section 6 of the 
HRA.250 The relatives of the six decedents in Al-Skeini sought judicial review 
of the Secretary of State for Defence’s refusal to order such an inquiry. This 
analysis focuses on the House of Lords’s approach to this question, whether or 
not the ECHR ultimately validates that approach.251 
By the time Al-Skeini reached the House of Lords, two central points 
were at issue. The first was whether the relatives of those who were allegedly 
shot by British troops on military patrol in Basra252 were entitled to invoke the 
HRA. The second was on what basis the Convention applied to the sixth 
decedent, who was beaten to death by British troops while in British custody,253 
and whether the HRA should be congruent in scope. Article 1 of the 
Convention binds contracting parties to secure enumerated rights “to everyone 
within their jurisdiction.”254 The HRA does not incorporate Article 1 of the 
Convention,255 but four out of five Law Lords found it appropriate to interpret 
the HRA’s territorial scope in light of the scope the Convention would be 
accorded by the ECHR in Strasbourg.256 Only one, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, 
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would have rejected any extraterritorial application of the HRA in Iraq 
regardless of the scope of the Convention, emphasizing the divisional court’s 
statement that “‘[i]t is intuitively difficult to think that Parliament intended to 
legislate for foreign lands.’”257 
The majority conceded the exceptional nature of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction but observed that the nationality principle permits Parliament to 
regulate the conduct of British citizens outside the United Kingdom as long as 
this does not “offend against the sovereignty” of other states.258 The majority 
emphasized the special nature of the HRA as not “just another domestic 
statute”259 and focused on its “overall nature and purpose.”260 Lord Rodger of 
Earlsferry observed: 
[W]here a public authority has power to operate outside of the United Kingdom 
and does so legitimately—for example, with the consent of the other state—in 
the absence of any indication to the contrary, when construing any relevant 
legislation, it would only be sensible to treat the public authority, so far as 
possible, in the same way as when it operates at home.261 
This statement resonates with the ECHR’s statement in Issa v. Turkey that 
“article 1 of the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a state party to 
perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of another state, which 
it could not perpetrate on its own territory.”262 However, although the majority 
in Al-Skeini did not adopt a strict country approach,263 it also stopped short of 
endorsing the strong conscience approach reflected in the ECHR’s statement in 
Issa, which was issued by a chamber of seven judges, and not a seventeen-
judge “Grand Chamber.” Lord Rodger found the language from Issa 
inconsistent with other ECHR jurisprudence, because it “appears to focus on 
the activity of the contracting state, rather than on the requirement that the 
victim should be within its jurisdiction.”264 Instead, the Al-Skeini majority 
adopted a position that emphasizes the importance of territory without 
precluding the extraterritorial application of the HRA in exceptional 
circumstances, based on its reading of the unanimous decision of the ECHR 
 
 257. Id. [24] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) (quoting R (Al-Skeini) v. Sec’y of State for Def., 
[2004] EWHC (Admin) 2911, [304], [2005] 2 W.L.R. 1401, [241]-[242] (Eng.)). 
 258. Id. [46] (Lord Rodger of Earlsferry). This is consistent with the pre-Hape approach of the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
 259. Id. [138] (Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood). 
 260. Id. [52] (Lord Rodger of Earlsferry). 
 261. Id. [53]. 
 262. Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 567, ¶ 71 (2004). 
 263. Lord Rodger specifically rejected the idea, reflected in Hape, that applying the HRA to 
British agents would offend against the sovereignty of Iraq: 
The purpose of the 1998 Act is to provide remedies in our domestic law to those whose 
human rights are violated by a United Kingdom public authority. Making such remedies 
available for acts of a United Kingdom authority on the territory of another state would 
not be offensive to the sovereignty of the other state. There is therefore nothing in the 
wider context of international law which points to the need to confine sections 6 and 7 of 
the 1998 Act to the territory of the United Kingdom. 
Al-Skeini v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 26, [54], [2008] 1 A.C. 153, [54] (Lord Rodger of 
Earlsferry) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 264. Id. [75]. 
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Grand Chamber in Banković v. Belgium.265 
The Banković case arose from the NATO bombing of the Radio-
Television Serbia headquarters in Belgrade during the 1999 conflict in Kosovo. 
The Grand Chamber found that the victims were not within the jurisdiction of 
the states that carried out the attack and could therefore not invoke the 
protections of the Convention.266 The Law Lords in Al-Skeini drew the 
conclusion from Banković that “when considering the question of jurisdiction 
under the Convention, the focus has shifted to the victim or, more precisely, to 
the link between the victim and the contracting state.”267 Absent such a link, 
individuals will not be considered within the jurisdiction of the acting state and 
will therefore be unable to invoke Convention rights. The question is whether 
the facts of a particular case are sufficient to create the required jurisdictional 
link. 
The divisional court in Al-Skeini, whose reasoning the House of Lords 
endorsed, expressed doubt that the “effective control of an area” by U.K. forces 
could, by itself, confer rights on individuals outside the territorial borders of the 
Convention’s forty-seven states parties.268 Under the Law Lords’ reading of 
Banković, the fact that a contracting state’s action has allegedly harmed the 
victim does not itself provide a jurisdictional link. Instead, in order for the 
Convention—and thus the HRA—to constrain the state’s actions, (1) the state 
must have “effective control” of the area in which the alleged rights violation 
occurred, and (2) that area must be within the “espace juridique” of the 
Convention.269 Absent these factors, there will not be a sufficient link between 
the state and the affected individual to bring that individual (or his or her 
surviving relatives) within the scope of the HRA’s protections. 
The House of Lords’s approach in Al-Skeini has attracted criticism as a 
misinterpretation of ECHR case law.270 From the perspective of this analysis, 
the more salient question is why the Law Lords saw fit to impose the additional 
espace juridique requirement in applying the HRA, rather than whether this 
approach is faithful to European precedents. In support of this approach, the 
Law Lords seized upon language from Banković characterizing the Convention 
as “‘a constitutional instrument of European public order’, operating ‘in an 
essentially regional context.’”271 They heeded the divisional court’s warning 
 
 265. See id. [68] (Lord Rodger of Earlsferry) (citing Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 333); see also id. [131]-[132] (Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood) (rejecting Issa approach in 
favor of Banković). 
 266. Banković, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 82. 
 267. Al-Skeini, [2007] UKHL 26, [64]. 
 268. R (Al-Skeini) v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2004] EWHC (Admin) 2911, [219], [2005] 2 
W.L.R. 1401, [219] (Eng.). 
 269. See generally Banković, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333. 
 270. See, e.g., Ralph Wilde, The “Legal Space” or “Espace Juridique” of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Is It Relevant to Extraterritorial State Action?, 2005 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 115, 120; Joanne Williams, Al-Skeini: A Flawed Interpretation of Banković, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 
687 (2005); see also Olivier de Schutter, Globalization and Jurisdiction: Lessons from the European 
Convention on Human Rights 17 (Ctr. for Human Rights and Global Justice, Working Paper No. 9, 
2005). 
 271. Al-Skeini, [2007] UKHL 26, [127] (Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood) (quoting 
Banković, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 80). 
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that endorsing a broad approach to the extraterritorial application of the 
Convention would leave “entirely side-lined the doctrine that there is any 
difference between the espace juridique of the Convention and any other space 
anywhere in the world.”272 This observation emphasizes the role of a 
constitutional instrument in subdividing geographic space by defining the 
relationship between those who exercise lawful coercive power and those who 
are subject to it in primarily spatial terms. 
Applying elements of this reasoning, the Law Lords rejected the claims 
brought on behalf of the five individuals shot by British troops on patrol in 
Basra. Lord Brown emphasized: 
[I]t would be quite another [proposition] to accept that whenever a contracting 
state acts (militarily or otherwise) through its agents abroad, those affected by 
such activities fall within its article 1 jurisdiction. Such a contention would 
prove altogether too much. It would make a nonsense of much that was said in 
Bankovic, not least as to the Convention being “a constitutional instrument of 
European public order”, operating “in an essentially regional context”, “not 
designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of 
contracting states.” It would, indeed, make redundant the principle of effective 
control of an area: what need for that if jurisdiction arises in any event under a 
general principle of “authority and control” irrespective of whether the area is 
(a) effectively controlled or (b) within the Council of Europe?273 
The Law Lords appear to have taken for granted that the five individuals in Al-
Skeini were within the “control” of British troops when they were shot, whether 
or not they were also within the “authority” of the U.K. government. They 
therefore turned to the concept of espace juridique as a limitation on the 
geographic scope of the HRA in order to explain why these five individuals 
were not within U.K. jurisdiction at the time of their deaths and thus did not 
benefit from the right to a public inquiry. 
Imposing an espace juridique requirement also flowed from the Law 
Lords’ understanding that the Convention (and the HRA) must apply in whole, 
or not at all, to a particular geographic area.274 The Law Lords’ finding that 
 
 272. Al-Skeini, [2004] EWHC (Admin) 2911, [219]. The divisional court acknowledged that the 
espace juridique doctrine might not play a role where state action affects a national of that state, because 
nationality rather than territory would supply the necessary jurisdictional link in that circumstance. Id. 
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exception to the principle of territoriality to the extent that a state agent exercises control over a national 
of that state, wherever that occurs”). But see Smith v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2010] UKSC 29, [2010] 3 
W.L.R. 223 (appeal taken from Eng.) (finding that a soldier serving in the British Army in Iraq is only 
within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for the purposes of the HRA when physically present on a 
British military base); Abbasi v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] EWCA 
(Civ) 1598, [77], [79] (Eng.) (holding that a British national detained at Guantanamo Bay was not within 
U.K. jurisdiction for HRA purposes because U.K. state agents did not exercise any “control or 
authority” over him). 
 273. Al-Skeini, [2007] UKHL 26, [127] (Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood) (quoting 
Banković, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 80). 
 274. See id. [79] (Lord Rodger of Earlsferry). For rejections of this premise, see Hugh King, 
Unravelling the Extraterritorial Riddle: An Analysis of R (Hassan) v. Secretary of State for Defence, 7 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 633, 640 (2009); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Subcomm. 
on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Françoise Hampson & Ibrahim Salama, Administration of 
Justice, Rule of Law and Democracy: Working Paper on the Relationship Between Human Rights Law 
and International Humanitarian Law, 57th Sess., ¶ 88, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/14 (June 21, 
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individuals in the homes and streets of Basra could not assert a right to a public 
inquiry under the HRA was buttressed by their observation that “the idea that 
the United Kingdom was obliged to secure observance of all the rights and 
freedoms as interpreted by the European Court in the utterly different society of 
southern Iraq is manifestly absurd.”275 Consequently, under Al-Skeini, “[T]he 
obligation under article 1 can arise only where the contracting state has such 
effective control of the territory of another state that it could secure to everyone 
in the territory all the rights and freedoms in Section 1 of the Convention.”276 
Under this reading, arguably none of the six claimants ought to have benefitted 
from the protection of the HRA, not because the HRA can never apply 
extraterritorially, but because in order for this to happen the foreign territory 
would essentially have to be transformed into a de facto extension of the United 
Kingdom. 
The Secretary of State for Defence conceded on appeal that the HRA 
applied to Baha Mousa, who was beaten to death by British troops while 
detained in a British military detention unit. The question for the House of 
Lords was whether this was because of a special exception encompassing 
military detention facilities, as the divisional court had found, or because the 
United Kingdom had in fact exercised “authority and control” over Mr. Mousa 
from the time of his arrest, as found by the court of appeal.277 Lord Brown 
determined, and the majority agreed, that a military detention facility could 
most appropriately be viewed as analogous to an embassy or consulate and was 
encompassed by the HRA on that basis.278 
Lord Brown did not elaborate on his reasons for adopting the embassy 
analogy, making it difficult to discern why he preferred this approach. The 
embassy exception appears in the divisional court’s opinion as an alternative to 
the effective control doctrine. The divisional court reasoned: 
It seems to us that it is not at all straining the examples of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction discussed in the jurisprudence considered above to hold that a 
British military prison, operating in Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi sovereign 
authorities, and containing arrested suspects, falls within even a narrowly 
limited exception exemplified by embassies, consulates, vessels and aircraft, 
and in the case of Hess v. United Kingdom, a prison [within the British zone in 
West Berlin].279 
This reasoning emphasizes the unique character of certain facilities (such as 
 
2005) (indicating that “[j]urisdiction is not an all or nothing affair”); and De Schutter, supra note 270, at 
13. 
 275. Al-Skeini, [2007] UKHL 26, [78] (Lord Rodger of Earlsferry) (emphasis added). 
 276. Id. [79]. 
 277. Id. [107] (Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood). 
 278. Id. [132]. 
 279. R (Al-Skeini) v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2004] EWHC (Admin) 2911, [287], [2005] 2 
W.L.R. 1401, [287] (Eng.). The divisional court noted that the European Commission in Hess v. United 
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embassies) and objects (such as aircraft) that are deemed, for certain purposes, 
to be enclaves or extensions of the national territory.280 The court found itself 
resorting to these examples in an effort to justify the extension of the HRA to 
Mr. Mousa, even though his death did not occur within the espace juridique of 
the Convention but rather, by one account, in a “disused toilet block in a partly 
destroyed hotel requisitioned by British forces.”281 This resort to the embassy 
analogy was necessary because the espace juridique idea, and the 
corresponding notion that Convention rights must apply in their entirety or not 
at all, would otherwise preclude the extraterritorial application of the HRA to 
the activities of U.K. agents in Iraq under any circumstances. 
The House of Lords could have used the “authority and control” standard 
to differentiate between the case of Baha Mousa, who was arrested by British 
soldiers and died in British custody, from those of the other five claimants, as 
the court of appeal had done.282 Instead, by relying on the embassy exception, 
the Al-Skeini opinion invited a very narrow reading of the territorial scope of 
the HRA, which the claimants subsequently challenged in the ECHR. If the 
ECHR in Al-Skeini applies a more expansive approach to claims involving the 
actions of member states outside the espace juridique of the Council of Europe, 
this will force a reevaluation of the persistent territorial emphasis in U.K. 
jurisprudence under the HRA to date.283 
2. Cabining Domestic Rights 
The implications of Al-Skeini have become apparent in subsequent cases. 
 
 280. Interestingly, the divisional court also cited the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in R. 
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253. 
 281. See Al-Saadoon v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2009] EWCA (Civ) 7, [26], [2009] 3 W.L.R. 
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In Al-Saadoon v. Secretary of State for Defence, the court of appeal relied in 
large part on the espace juridique idea to find that two Iraqi nationals arrested 
and detained by U.K. forces in 2003 were not within the jurisdiction of the 
United Kingdom for HRA purposes.284 The applicants could therefore not 
invoke the HRA to block their transfer by U.K. forces to the Iraqi High 
Tribunal for trial on murder charges, which could carry the death penalty. The 
court of appeal posed the question as “whether the ECHR writ runs, so to 
speak, to the British base in Basra.”285 The divisional court had answered this 
question in the affirmative, but it had nevertheless declined to enjoin the 
transfer of the two Iraqis on the grounds that the United Kingdom’s 
international obligation to comply with the transfer request took precedence 
over claims under the HRA in these circumstances.286 
The court of appeal also declined to enjoin the transfer, but for different 
reasons. It found that the two individuals were not within U.K. jurisdiction 
even though they were in U.K. custody because, during the relevant time 
periods, U.K. forces “were not entitled to carry out any activities on Iraq’s 
territory in relation to criminal detainees save as consented to by Iraq.”287 The 
court of appeal reasoned that, in order for the HRA to apply extraterritorially, 
the government actors involved “must enjoy the discretion to decide questions 
of a kind which ordinarily fall to the State’s executive government.”288 The 
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court in Al-Saadoon read the decision in Al-Skeini as privileging the country-
based strand of reasoning in Banković over the conscience-based language in 
Issa. Although this is a fair reading of Al-Skeini, it is arguably not a fair reading 
of European precedents. The Al-Saadoon decision supports the observation that 
national courts appear inclined to take a narrower approach than their 
international counterparts to the definition of jurisdiction, and thus to the 
geographic reach of rights. 
Indeed, the ECHR reached a different conclusion than the U.K. court of 
appeals in Al-Saadoon when asked to determine whether the Convention 
applied in the circumstances. The ECHR held in its admissibility decision that 
“given the total and exclusive de facto, and subsequently also de jure, control 
exercised by the United Kingdom authorities over the premises in question, the 
individuals detained there, including the applicants, were within the United 
Kingdom’s jurisdiction.”289 The admissibility decision found a jurisdictional 
link between the applicants and the U.K. government based on the applicants’ 
presence within a U.K.-run detention facility, notwithstanding their legal 
classification as “criminal detainees” by an Iraqi court order. On the merits, a 
chamber of the ECHR determined that the United Kingdom violated its 
obligation under the European Convention not to turn the applicants over to the 
Iraqi High Tribunal without assurances that they would not face the death 
penalty.290 
Another noteworthy U.K. case is Hassan v. Secretary of State for 
Defence, which was argued before the divisional court in January 2009.291 
Tarek Resaan Hassan was detained by U.K. military personnel in Iraq in April 
2003 and released in May 2003. In September 2003, his bruised and bullet-
ridden body was found in the Iraqi countryside. Hassan’s family brought an 
action under the HRA to compel a public inquiry. The claimants in Hassan, 
who were represented by the same lead counsel who represented the appellants 
in Al-Skeini,292 argued that, under Al-Skeini, the exercise by U.K. agents of 
effective authority and control over an individual in foreign territory brings that 
individual within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for the purposes of the 
HRA.293 The divisional court, invoking Al-Saadoon,294 read Al-Skeini for the 
narrow proposition that U.K.-run detention facilities are analogous to 
embassies, and rejected an “authority and control” standard that would have 
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brought Hassan within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom when he was 
first detained by U.K. forces.295 
The embassy analogy proved fatal to Hassan’s claim because of the 
particular circumstances of his detention. Hassan was detained at Camp Bucca 
pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding signed by the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and Australia, under which the United Kingdom was the 
“Detaining Power” and the United States was the “Accepting Power.”296 The 
divisional court found that only the “Accepting Power” had jurisdiction over 
the detainees under an “effective control” standard.297 The embassy exception 
did not apply because the United Kingdom could not “impose its own law” at 
the facility.298 Hassan’s family could therefore not invoke the HRA to compel a 
public inquiry into the circumstances of his death. 
Perhaps surprisingly, even members of the U.K. armed forces do not 
automatically benefit from the HRA under the Al-Skeini framework. Although 
the U.K. court of appeal found in Secretary of State for Defence v. Smith that 
individuals serving in the British Army are within U.K. jurisdiction for the 
purposes of the HRA, the U.K. Supreme Court rejected this result.299 The 
question was “academic” because Private Smith died in a military hospital, and 
the Secretary of State for Defence conceded that he was therefore with U.K. 
jurisdiction under the holding in Al-Skeini.300 However, the court of appeal had 
agreed with the divisional court that Private Smith’s service in the British Army 
provided the jurisdictional link between the victim and the U.K. government 
required by Al-Skeini, whether or not the alleged harm occurred within a British 
base or hospital.301 The court of appeal reasoned that it made no sense for 
Convention rights to depend on the accident of location in this context.302 It 
distinguished Al-Saadoon on the grounds that, in that case, the victims were 
Iraqis.303 
In Smith, the court of appeal applied the compact-based strand of 
reasoning in Al-Skeini, which focuses on the link between the victim and the 
government. It privileges the “Who?” question rather than the “Where?” 
question. When the Smith case reached the Supreme Court, only three out of 
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nine justices endorsed a compact approach. Lord Mance, articulating the 
minority approach, reasoned: 
The relationship [between the United Kingdom and its armed forces] is not 
territorial, it depends in every context and respect on a reciprocal bond, of 
authority and control on the one hand and allegiance and obedience on the 
other. The armed forces serve on that basis. The compact is that they will 
receive the support and protection of the country they serve.304 
This is as clear an expression as one can find of a compact approach, but it was 
not the preferred approach of a majority of the justices in Smith. 
Instead, a majority of the U.K. Supreme Court endorsed a “bright-line,” 
territorial approach that would encompass British military bases and hospitals, 
but not other locations within occupied Iraq. Lord Brown, who had adopted the 
embassy analogy for military bases in Al-Skeini, rejected a compact model. He 
reasoned that, under a compact model, “those responsible for the planning, 
control and execution of military operations w[ould] owe [Convention] duties 
to our servicemen but not to the civilians whose safety is also imperilled by 
such operations,” which would produce “an odd and unsatisfactory 
situation.”305 To avoid this situation, and absent explicit guidance from the 
ECHR, Lord Brown declined to extend Convention rights “to our armed forces 
generally whilst serving abroad.”306 
Lord Collins, whose reasons a majority of the justices endorsed, explicitly 
contrasted the result in Smith with the U.S. position that constitutional rights 
benefit U.S. citizens overseas.307 He noted that it is “not easy to extract a 
common principled basis” for the extraterritorial application of the Convention 
under ECHR case law,308 which could in any event occur only on an 
exceptional basis. Relying on the Grand Chamber’s decision in Banković, he 
rejected the court of appeal’s approach, which interpreted Lord Rodger’s 
decision in Al-Skeini as making a simple “jurisdictional link” sufficient to 
establish jurisdiction under the HRA.309 Lord Rodger agreed with this 
interpretation and joined the reasons of Lord Collins.310 Lord Collins found no 
support in the understandings of the framers of the Convention,311 or in policy 
arguments, for “extending the scope of the Convention to armed forces 
abroad”312 when they are not on a British military base or in a British hospital. 
Five other justices agreed. 
The net result of this jurisprudence is that the HRA extends on an 
exceptional basis to individuals located in U.K.-run military facilities overseas, 
but it does not otherwise extend to any individuals located outside the espace 
juridique of Europe, even if they are U.K. citizens. It remains to be seen 
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whether the ECHR will adopt a more expansive interpretation of the reach of 
Convention rights. If the ECHR does adopt a more expansive interpretation, it 
seems safe to predict that U.K. courts will continue to take the narrowest 
possible approach to the extraterritorial application of the HRA that is 
consistent with the ECHR’s reasoning and with the limited exceptions already 
recognized for British embassies, military bases, and hospitals. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Several observations emerge from the foregoing analysis. First, domestic 
courts do not view the reach of domestic rights as commensurate with the 
exercise of government power. Rather, on the whole, these courts gravitate 
toward country-based reasoning that restricts the operation of rights-based 
constraints beyond the national territory by focusing on where the government 
acted. Domestic judicial reasoning thus tends to reflect and reinforce a 
fundamentally territorial conception of constitutional rights that assumes a 
strong—although not impermeable—barrier between a government’s domestic 
and international activities, and its domestic and international obligations. This 
stands in contrast to the approach increasingly taken by international bodies, 
which have been willing to construe the geographic scope of regional and 
international rights more broadly.313 
Second, a compact approach that focuses on who was affected by the 
government’s action has appeared in the reasoning of U.S. courts, but it has 
been largely absent from recent Canadian and U.K. cases at the supreme court 
level. Courts in the United States have been more willing to differentiate 
among individuals on the basis of their presumed national allegiance and to 
conceptualize certain constitutional guarantees as part of a bargain between the 
government and a defined group of individuals. Canadian and U.K. courts, by 
contrast, have been more inclined to resist differentiating among individuals, 
even if this means denying domestic rights protections to citizens and 
noncitizens alike. 
Third, a conscience-based approach that focuses what the government did 
regardless of where the government acted or who the government harmed has 
not found favor in domestic courts of last resort. Although these courts 
generally do not treat the extraterritorial exercise of government power as 
completely unconstrained, they have not accepted the invitation to apply 
judicially enforceable constraints wherever, and toward whomever, the 
government acts. Rather, domestic courts have used conscience-based 
reasoning as a backstop to justify judicial intervention in circumstances that a 
country or compact approach would not reach, but that threaten the polity’s 
fundamental constitutive principles, including the separation (balance) of 
powers. 
The rest of these conclusions elaborate briefly on these observations. The 
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primary goals of this study have been to explore how judges in three common 
law countries have reasoned about rights beyond borders and to identify certain 
patterns in that reasoning. Below, I offer some additional thoughts about what 
might account for these patterns and their potential implications. 
A. Explaining Different Approaches 
Country, compact, and conscience approaches to extraterritorial rights 
reflect different conceptions of legal and political ordering. A country approach 
emphasizes the role of law in regulating relationships within a particular 
territory. A compact approach emphasizes the role of law in regulating 
interactions among members of a particular group. A conscience approach 
emphasizes the role of law in protecting fundamental human values. A variety 
of factors could influence which approach, or which combination of 
approaches, finds favor in a given country’s domestic courts at a given point in 
time and in response to a given set of circumstances. 
A country approach literally circumscribes the role of the domestic 
judiciary in enforcing rights-based limits on extraterritorial government action. 
Judges from different countries might be receptive to different arguments in 
favor of this approach. For example, the Canadian Supreme Court has justified 
a country approach largely on the basis of respect for the territorial sovereignty 
of foreign governments, which reflects the emphasis that Canada places on 
being a cooperative member of international society. The U.K. Supreme Court 
has invoked concerns about legal imperialism, which reflect the long shadow 
cast by Great Britain’s colonial legacy. Even if these rationales are at least 
partly strategic, rather than sincere, they provide some insight into why these 
courts have been receptive to different arguments. 
Reasons for U.S. courts’ adoption of a compact approach could include 
the special historical significance of the U.S. Constitution in defining the 
American polity, compared to the more recent legislative adoption of codified 
rights commitments in Canada and the United Kingdom. The Canadian Charter 
and the HRA belong to a later generation of domestic rights regimes inspired to 
a large extent by international human rights instruments.314 This difference 
could help explain the notable absence of compact-based reasoning in Canadian 
and U.K. decisions, although it does less to explain the absence of such 
reasoning from U.S. cases prior to Reid v. Covert. One reason for that absence 
could be that, as Kal Raustiala has observed, in the numerous cases involving 
new overseas U.S. territories decided between 1900 and 1922, “the justices 
appeared concerned with how best to avoid fettering the imperial ambitions the 
nation possessed or might develop in the future.”315 Even within the United 
States, a compact approach has not always found favor with judges, especially 
when it has conflicted with other government policies. 
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The effect of extralegal factors on the attractiveness of different 
conceptions of domestic rights is most evident in the widespread judicial 
reluctance to adopt a conscience approach. The U.S. Supreme Court expressed 
its concern about extralegal consequences in Johnson v. Eisentrager when it 
stated that extending judicially enforceable rights to aliens overseas in 
situations of armed conflict would “hamper the war effort” by “allow[ing] the 
very enemies [a field commander] is ordered to reduce to submission to call 
him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from 
the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home.”316 Even so, 
domestic courts in more recent cases have also been loath to renounce any role 
for domestic rights regimes (and, thus, for judicial review) in constraining 
government action overseas. Instead, as in other areas of constitutional law, 
they have struggled to achieve a principled balance between judicial 
intervention and restraint. 
By way of example, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected a conscience approach, but it did not adopt a country 
approach that would have given U.S. agents a freer hand in overseas police 
operations involving U.S. citizens. During oral argument in Verdugo, Justice 
Kennedy pressed the government lawyer, Lawrence Robbins, to articulate 
criteria that would define when U.S. officials acting abroad would be 
constrained by the Constitution: 
Justice Kennedy: Does the Constitution control what United States officials do 
when they’re abroad generally? Or never? Or sometimes? 
Robbins: Well, I think the answer is sometimes, and the answer is it depends. 
And, of course, it’s the very fact that it depends— 
Justice Kennedy: When and what does it depend on? 
Robbins: Well, . . . . [T]he central failing, we believe, of the [Ninth Circuit] 
court of appeals, is that they thought it never depends. They thought that the 
Constitution, as it were, provides a sort of universal declaration of rights of 
man. It applies whenever, wherever and against whomever government 
authority acts. And we don’t believe that . . . .317 
This exchange illustrates the simultaneous rejection of a conscience-based 
approach (which Mr. Robbins attributed to the Ninth Circuit) and a reluctance 
to embrace a country approach that would preclude judicial enforcement of 
domestic rights beyond national borders in any circumstances. 
Domestic courts have thus sought a balance between allowing the 
political branches to conduct overseas operations free from excessive judicial 
interference, while at the same time maintaining some residual role in 
monitoring extraterritorial government action. The unwillingness of domestic 
courts to countenance the possibility of “law-free zones” (or “judicial-review-
free zones”) is evident in the U.S. Supreme Court’s observation that the U.S. 
government should not be able to deny individuals the right to file a habeas 
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petition simply by moving them from one location to another; the Canadian 
Supreme Court’s determination that the Canadian Charter applies to actions by 
the Canadian government that violate fundamental human rights; and the 
preemptive concessions by the U.K. government that the deaths of Baha Mousa 
and Private Smith should have been followed by public inquiries, albeit on 
narrower grounds than the claimants advanced. 
The result in future cases is likely to depend largely on whether courts 
feel that the political branches are adequately monitoring their own 
extraterritorial activities, or whether courts perceive that the political branches 
are attempting to create “law-free” zones rather than responding to legitimate 
and largely preexisting situational constraints. This dynamic was evident in the 
D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Al-Maqaleh v. Gates, which held that detainees at 
Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan do not enjoy the constitutional 
protection of the Suspension Clause. The court explicitly found that the 
petitioners’ suggestion that the Executive could choose to detain them in an 
“active conflict zone” in order to avoid judicial review “is not what happened 
here,”318 but that such “manipulation by the Executive might constitute an 
additional factor in some case in which it is in fact present.”319 
Domestic courts have generally been more circumspect about curbing the 
activities of political branches when they act abroad than at home.320 Whether 
or not one thinks such circumspection is problematic depends on one’s degree 
of confidence in the political branches to conform their own activities to 
applicable legal standards. For example, Jack Goldsmith has observed in the 
context of the Al-Aulaqi targeted killing case that “[t]he absence of judicial 
review of the president’s targeting decisions does not mean that those decisions 
are lawless”321 and that those who take a different position ignore or 
underestimate the president’s duty of “self-compliance with law.”322 In the 
cases studied here, judges appear just as reluctant to concede their own 
irrelevance as they are to interfere with decisions that they are ill equipped to 
second-guess. Balancing these impulses can be especially challenging for 
judges in common law systems, who are tasked with articulating principled 
rationales for the recognition or nonrecognition of judicially enforceable rights 
that will then be applied in other contexts. 
The three categories identified here capture basic elements of the 
reasoning common law judges have used as they grapple with these difficult 
decisions. Each identifies a distinctive core focus of judicial inquiry into the 
extraterritorial application of domestic rights. This framework provides a 
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vocabulary for describing judicial decisions and helps identify certain patterns: 
the persistence of country-based reasoning; the presence of compact-based 
reasoning in U.S. jurisprudence, but its relative absence from Canadian and 
U.K. decisions; and the lack of judicial adoption of conscience-based reasoning 
except as a backstop to perceived violations by the political branches of 
domestic separation of powers principles and fundamental human rights. 
The question then becomes whether current jurisprudence is normatively 
satisfying, or whether it leaves gaps that need to be filled. In my view, at a 
minimum, the U.S. Supreme Court should give greater weight to the exclusive 
control of U.S. authorities over U.S. military bases, even within foreign 
territory. The Canadian Supreme Court should revisit Hape in light of its 
extradition jurisprudence and anchor judicially enforceable constraints on the 
activities of Canadian agents more firmly in the Charter, especially when those 
agents act vis-à-vis Canadian citizens. The U.K. Supreme Court should 
incorporate elements of compact-based reasoning into its analysis of 
jurisdiction under the HRA, especially where U.K. troops are concerned. That 
said, I would stop short of endorsing a conscience approach that is not sensitive 
to the exigencies of conducting extraterritorial law enforcement or military 
operations, or that subjects the political branches to excessive legal uncertainty. 
In an ideal world, rather than using international rights violations as a trigger 
for the application of domestic law (as in Khadr I), I would strengthen the 
ability of domestic courts to enforce a limited set of clearly defined 
fundamental human rights guarantees. 
B. The Role of International Rights 
Patterns of judicial reasoning exhibit a certain degree of path dependence, 
but they are not immutable. Just as shifts in substantive law might be 
attributable to both internal and external factors (such as the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s revised stance on extradition to face the death penalty), so too might 
decisions about the extraterritorial reach of domestic rights. 
Developments in regional and international jurisprudence are among the 
external factors nudging domestic courts toward more expansive interpretations 
of the geographic reach of domestic rights. The interaction between domestic 
and international rights is most apparent in the HRA, which explicitly creates 
domestic entitlements based on European Convention rights. Consequently, 
although U.K. courts interpreting the HRA are not directly bound by 
Strasbourg case law, they inevitably reference those decisions and seek to 
reconcile them with domestic interpretations. Expansive interpretations of 
Convention rights by the ECHR can contribute to domestic pressure within the 
United Kingdom for more generous interpretations of the HRA, as well as 
provide individuals with a competing forum for pursuing rights-based claims. 
Other domestic courts might also come under pressure to “ratchet up” 
domestic guarantees in the face of more robust (if less readily enforceable) 
international protections. For example, in Khadr I, the Canadian Supreme 
Court explicitly invoked international human rights violations as the trigger for 
applying the Canadian Charter. In the oral argument before the ECHR in Al-
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Skeini v. The United Kingdom, James Eadie QC emphasized on behalf of the 
United Kingdom that international law constrains extraterritorial government 
action, even if the European Convention does not apply.323 Although references 
to international law might seem largely strategic absent a Khadr-type trigger 
mechanism, they provide public affirmation that domestic constitutional 
provisions are not the only source of applicable constraints. 
International law would have provided a response to Justice Stevens’s 
question to Deputy Solicitor General Edwin Kneedler during oral argument in 
Clark v. Martinez, a case involving the potentially indefinite detention of 
immigrants who had not been “admitted” to the United States.324 Justice 
Stevens asked: 
Just going to your constitutional position, it’s clear that a person who’s not been 
admitted and has been paroled could be excluded forthwith, summarily, and so 
forth because he’s never been admitted. But does that person have any 
protection under the Constitution? Could we shoot him?325 
Mr. Kneedler indicated that the United States could not shoot the person, but he 
could not articulate why this was so.326 Had Mr. Eadie been arguing this case, 
he would likely have responded that international law applies. In this picture, 
broadly speaking, domestic rights constrain government action within the 
polity, and international rights constrain government action beyond the polity. 
To the extent that individuals rely on judicial enforcement to give effect to their 
rights, such a scheme would require greater domestic judicial authority and 
willingness to enforce certain fundamental human rights based on international, 
rather than domestic, law. 
International human rights seem particularly well suited to a conscience 
approach, and thus to extraterritorial application, because they are based 
explicitly on the intrinsic dignity and worth of individual human beings 
regardless of geographic location or national membership. That said, one could 
predict that many of the practical considerations that drive restrictive 
interpretations of domestic rights would also tend to limit the interpretation and 
application of international rights by domestic courts, notwithstanding the 
relatively broader interpretations reached by international bodies.327 
Individuals are situated within multiple layers of legal protection by 
domestic, regional, and international instruments, and governments are 
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correspondingly subject to multiple layers of potential constraints. Although 
these protections and constraints are not uniformly judicially enforceable, 
individuals are increasingly able to choose among them in advancing claims 
against governments in the court of public opinion, if not in actual court. If 
international human rights bodies issue too many opinions that are vastly more 
expansive than those of national courts, they are likely to lose adherents, even 
among states that are otherwise dedicated to compliance with international law. 
Conversely, if domestic courts focus excessively on the constraining role of 
borders, this could have the paradoxical effect of fostering developments that 
privilege and entrench international, rather than domestic, rights in legal 
discourse and, eventually, in legal and political institutions. 
 
